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Case No. 20090489-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
vs.

Luis Mirio Ceron,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Utah appeals the pretrial dismissal with prejudice of one count
each of attempted murder and aggravated kidnapping, both first degree felonies.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009)
(pour-over provision).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Does State v. Brickey preclude refiling a felony information, where the prior
dismissal was not based on a lack of probable cause and where no evidence
suggested a potential abusive practice by the prosecutor?
Standard of Review. A trial court's interpretation of case law is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, % 1, 34 P.3d 767.

Preservation: The State preserved this issue in its oral argument opposing the
motion to dismiss. See T09:11:15-26.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant rule is reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah R. Crim. P. 7;
Utah R. Crim. P. 25
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
On October 7, 2008, Pacheco-Ortega and his co-defendant Luis Ceron were
charged by information with one count of attempted murder with injury, in

Because this is an appeal from the dismissal of a refiled information, the
record consists of pleadings files and transcripts from two different numbered
prosecutions: Case No. 081907681 (original case) and Case No. 091902779 (refiled
case). This brief will cite to the pleadings file with an "R" followed by the first two
digits of the applicable district court case number, a colon, and the record page.
E.g., R08:l-3; R09:32. Citations to the transcripts will begin with a "T" followed by
the first two digits of the applicable district court case number, a colon, the record
number of the transcript, another colon, and the internal page number of the
transcript. E.g., T08:25:10; T09:ll:26.
However, the joint January 15, 2009 preliminary hearing transcript was
inadvertently not included in Ceron7s appellate record, although the State requested
that it be included. But two copies of that hearing are included in Pacheco-Ortega's
appellate record, Case No. 20090488-CA. The State is moving contemporaneously
with the filing of this brief to consolidate the two appeals for purposes of argument
and decision. The January 15, 2009 transcript is attached as Addendum B to this
brief for the convenience of counsel and the Court. Because that transcript has not
been assigned a record number in Ceron's appeal, this brief will cite to that
transcript as Add. B, followed by the internal page number.
2

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (West Supp. 2008), and one count of
aggravated kidnapping, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp.
2008), first degree felonies. R08:l-5; R09:l-3. After a failed attempted resolution, the
district court set a preliminary hearing date for January 15, 2009. R08:20-21.
The preliminary hearing was continued twice on the parties' agreement so
that the victim/witness, who had an outstanding warrant, could obtain and consult
with his own counsel. R08:40-41, 51-52; Add. B:4-6; T08:25:3-5. At the third
preliminary hearing setting on April 2, 2009, the magistrate dismissed the case
against both defendants without prejudice, because the victim/witness—for the first
time—failed to appear. T08:26:4-5, 8,10-11.
The State refiled the cases against both defendants later that day. R09:01.
Pacheco-Ortega moved to quash the refiled information on the ground that it was
refiled in violation of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Ceron later joined
Pacheco-Ortega's motion at the hearing on the motion. T09:ll:2. On May 26, 2009,
the magistrate entered an order dismissing the refiled information in both cases
with prejudice because "in re-filing this case the State violated the standards

3

articulated in State v. Brickey[.]" R09:9.

The State timely appealed from both

dismissals.2 R09:12.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tlie crimes3
On October 1, 2008, Michael Fleming went to Luis Ceron's business to
complete a drug deal. R09:2-3. Pacheco-Ortega, Ceron, and twin juveniles beat,
kicked, tasered, bound, and threatened Fleming with gams. R09:2-3; T09:ll:15.
Ceron shoved a gun down Fleming's throat and "announced in some detail how
[he] was going to die." R09:3; T09:ll:15. Fleming passed out. T09:ll:15. A rag
shoved into Fleming's mouth was secured by duct tape. T09:ll:15. A "severely
injured" Fleming was then stuffed into the trunk of a car, "while he listened to his
attackers planning the best way to kill him and dispose of his body." R09:3;
T09:ll:15.

2

As stated in footnote 1, the State is filing a contemporaneous motion to
consolidate this and Pacheco-Ortega's appeal for purposes of argument and
decision.
3

The alleged facts are taken from the probable cause statement of the
information and the prosecutor's proffered facts in the motion to dismiss hearing.
Because neither Pacheco-Ortega nor Ceron have been tried, the presumption of
innocence applies.
4

Based on "credible information," several police officers "made a SWAT entry
to preserve life" into Ceron's business. R09:3. The officers found Pacheco-Ortega,
Ceron, and the two juveniles there. R09:3; T09;ll:15. Pacheco-Ortega7s sleeves were
covered in blood. R09:3.
The officers rescued Fleming from the trunk of the car and, realizing that he
had been severely beaten, arranged for emergency medical care. R09:3; T09:ll:15. A
warrant search of Ceron's business yielded a bloody pipe, bloody rags, duct tape, a
bag containing a handgun with blood on the barrel, and several bags of cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamine. R09:3.
Fleming gave the officers a statement implicating the defendants. R09:2-3;
T09:ll:15.
The parties twice stipulate to continue the preliminai^y hearing4
After a failed resolution hearing, the cases were set for preliminary hearing on
January 15, 2009. R08:20-21. Both defendants, their counsel, and the State's two
witnesses—a police officer and Fleming—appeared. Add B:3-6. The State was
ready to proceed until Pacheco-Ortega's attorney noted that Fleming had his own
pending felony charges and, therefore, should have an opportunity to consult with
4

The complete transcripts of the two hearings are attached as Addendum B
(January 15, 2009), and Addendum C (February 26, 2009).
5

counsel before testifying. See Add B:4-6; T08:26:6-7. The parties therefore stipulated
that the preliminary hearing should be continued. Add B:4-6. Pacheco-Ortega's
attorney viewed the continuance as necessary because, otherwise, Fleming "will be
questioned and probably end up invoking the Fifth." Add B:5. The preliminary
hearing was continued to February 26, 2009. R08:41; Add B:6.
At the February 26, 2009 setting, the prosecution's two witnesses, including
Fleming, were again present and the prosecutor was again ready to proceed. See
T08:25:3-5. Newly-appointed counsel for Fleming was also present. T08:25:3-5. But
the parties agreed that the preliminary hearing needed to be continued again
because Fleming's counsel had been appointed only the day before and wanted
more time to consult with Fleming.

T08:25:3-4.

Pacheco-Ortega's attorney

explained that until the day before, Fleming had been represented by the same
public defender office as Pacheco-Ortega and that LDA had had to "scramble[]
around to get conflict counsel assigned" to Fleming. T08:25:4-5, 8-9. PachecoOrtega's attorney further represented that both he and the prosecutor had made
their "best efforts" to be ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing, but "that's
simply not going to happen in light of the recently appointed conflict lawyer."
T08:25:4-5.

6

On the parties7 agreement, the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for April
2,2009. T08:25:5. Pacheco-Ortega7 s attorney stated that while Pacheco-Ortega was
not waiving his speedy trial rights, the defense recognized that "the circumstances
mandate this continuance and there's nothing we can do about it/7 T08:25:6.
Moreover, Pacheco-Ortega was not eligible for release because an ICE hold had been
placed on him. T08:25:6.
Ceron7s attorney agreed the hearing should be continued, but asked that the
magistrate consider a reduction in Ceron's $100,000 bond.

T08:25:3-14.

He

acknowledged that Ceron, a U.S. citizen, had pending federal charges and was
subject to a federal no-bail hold, but opined that the no-bail hold was "in part
because of concern about state charges.77 T08:25 9-10. Ceron7s attorney hoped that a
significant reduction in bail might give "the feds some basis to reconsider [Ceron7s]
hold under the federal system/7 and allow him pretrial release. T08:25:10. Based on
the seriousness of the state charges, the magistrate declined to reduce bail.
The magistrate concluded the hearing, however, by stating, "We are all on the
same page and also with everything being reflected on today's hearing, even if there
are problems that arise, the hearing needs to go forward on April 2 or there will be
considerable rethinking of what's happening.77 T08:25:14.

7

Because Fleming was then in custody, the prosecutor stated that he would file
a motion to transport him to the next preliminary hearing, T08:25:5, 8,14.
April 2, 2009 hearing5
At the April 2, 2009 setting, the prosecutor stated that he was unable to
proceed because "an essential witness," Michael Fleming, was not present.6
T08:26:4. The prosecutor explained that he had learned, only the day before, that his
transportation order could not be honored because, unbeknownst to him, Fleming
had been released from custody. T08:26:4-5; T09:ll:18. The prosecutor had
unsuccessfully tried the day before the hearing to contact Fleming through his
counsel. T08:26:5. (Fleming's counsel was present at the April 2 hearing. T08:26:5).
The prosecutor had also attempted personal sendee that morning, but Fleming had
failed to appear at a scheduled presentence interview with AP&P. T08:26:4. An
investigator, who had previously communicated with Fleming, had also been
unable to contact him. T08:26:4-5.
The prosecutor asked for a continuance "because of this unavailable witness."
The prosecutor noted that although the State had had "success in tracking [Fleming]
5

The complete transcript of the April 2, 2009 hearing is attached as
Addendum D.
6

This was the first time this prosecutor had appeared on the case. T09:ll:4-5,

16-17.
8

down in the past/' it was unable to "find him for this preliminary hearing" on such
short notice. T08:26:5.
Both defendants for the first time objected to the continuance. T08:26:5-7.
Ceron's attorney moved for dismissal, arguing that the pending charges were
adversely affecting Ceron's ability to get pretrial release on his federal charges.
T08:26:5-6. Alternatively, Ceron asked for "straight release" on the state charges.
T08:26:6. Pacheco-Ortega likewise moved for dismissal, but "without prejudice with
the right of the State to refile were they to find Mr. Fleming." T08:26:6.
The magistrate confirmed with the prosecutor that Fleming was "not only the
key material witness," but also "the victim." T08:26:7. After noting the seriousness
of the allegations—"the beating and the tasering and the putting the gun in the
mouth"—the magistrate dismissed both cases without prejudice. T08:26:7-9. And
"given the nature of these offenses," the magistrate declined "to restrict the State in
any refiling, from doing it by warrant." T08:26:8-9.
The prosecutor asked the magistrate to stay the order of dismissal until 5:00
p.m. that day. T08:26:9. Anticipating a dismissal when he could not locate Fleming,
the prosecutor explained that he planned to refile both cases immediately. T08:26:910. Both defendants objected to a stay and argued that absent evidence of Fleming's
cooperation, refiling "would be inappropriate." T08:26:10.
9

That magistrate replied, "that is the basis of my ruling," but declined to place
any restrictions on when the State could refile, because the magistrate was "not in a
position" to make that determination:
I'm not going to make any restrictions about when the State can refile
because I'm not in a position to be reviewing that. The prosecution
knows the law, knows the case law that applies and knows statutes
and rules that apply that you can refile, but only under certain
circumstances and given the underlying basis of why I'm granting the
Motion to Dismiss is in fact Mr. Fleming's non-appearance today . . . .
T08:26:10-ll. The magistrate reiterated that it was not restricting when the State
could refile, leaving it up to the State to determine whether it could in "good faith"
"go forward" and "have the presence of the essential witness":
I simply am not going to make any orders that would say that if that's
refiled again by 5:00 because then that's putting pressure on the refiling
and without taking into consideration that you still don't have that
witness. If that changes and you do and the State feels like it can go
ahead and refile this case in full good faith, that you can go forward
and in good faith think you will have the presence of the essential
witness and that all occurs by 5:00, then that's pretty good.
T08:26:10-ll. The magistrate repeated a third time that it was not restricting the
timing of a refiling: "I'm not restricting that refiling but it does need to be fully and

10

1

completely meeting all of the requirements the State needs to do to refile."
T08:26:ll.
Refiling
The prosecutor refiled the charges against both defendants the same day, after
learning that his investigator had talked to Fleming's out-of-state mother. R08:67;
R091-2; T09:ll:18-19. The mother reported that she had been in contact with
Fleming and confirmed that he was in the Salt Lake area. T09:ll:19. She expected to
hear from him shortly because he needed to borrow money from her. T09:ll:19.
She promised to let Fleming know that the prosecutor was looking for him. Id.
Motion to dismiss
Within two weeks, both defendants moved to quash the ref iled information as
being "in violation of the standards established by the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)."8 Defendants cited no other basis for barring
the refiled charges. At the parties' request, the Brickey motion was set for hearing
before the magistrate who dismissed the original information. See generally T09:ll (a

The pleadings file does not contain a signed written order dismissing the
case. The only record of the dismissal is an unsigned minute entry, R08:67, and the
trial court's oral ruling, T08:26:8-12.
8

In fact, only Pacheco-Ortega filed a written motion, but Ceron joined that
motion orally at the hearing held on the motion. See R09:ll:2.
11

complete transcript of the April 23,2009 Brickey hearing is attached as Addendum
E).
Defendants' argument. At the Brickey hearing, Pacheco-Ortega conceded that
good cause justified the first two continuances. T09:ll:3-5. He argued, however,
that the dismissal at the April 2nd hearing occurred "because the State did not have
sufficient evidence to go forward and because of that, there are requirements under
Brickey and under the due process clause of the state constitution that the State then
has to comply with before a refiling is appropriate/' T09:ll:5. Pacheco-Ortega
contended that the investigator's talking to Fleming's out-of-state mother was not a
sufficient change of circumstances under Brickey: "There's got to be a lot more
contact, a lot more communication, much more substantial, meaningful
communications between the state and this missing witness before refiling is
appropriate, not some indication from a mother that she might hear from her son."
T09:ll:6.
Ceron joined Pacheco-Ortega's argument. T09:l 1:7-9. Both defendants
viewed the refiling as violating the magistrate's prior order dismissing the case.
T09:ll:5-9. Both believed that the magistrate's prior order directed the prosecutor
that before refiling, he "better have a good discussion with Mr. Fleming about

12

where he was, why he wasn't there and his intentions to go forward on this/7
T09:ll:6; see also T09:ll:8-ll.
Prosecutor's argument? The prosecutor argued that he refiled the charges in
good faith. T09:ll:20. In explaining the quick refiling, the prosecutor highlighted
the seriousness of the alleged crimes, the consequent need to continue to hold both
defendants, and the procedural history of the prosecution. T09:ll:15-21. The
prosecutor noted that Fleming had been personally served by the District Attorney's
office three times and that each time, Fleming appeared in court: the first time to
testify against the twin juveniles at a preliminary hearing in juvenile court and the
next two times to testify at the first two preliminary hearing dates in this case.10
T09:ll:16-17.
The prosecutor did not have Fleming personally served for the April 2nd
hearing, because Fleming was then in custody and subject to a transportation order.
T09:ll:18. The prosecutor learned just 24 hours before the April 2nd hearing that

9

The prosecutor did not file a written response because Pacheco-Ortega did
not file his supporting memorandum until the morning of the hearing. R09:ll:2.
10

Although Fleming was in custody at the second preliminary hearing, the
prosecutor explained that Fleming appeared at that hearing pursuant to subpoena,
and not as a result of a material witness warrant or transport order. T09:ll:17.
Thus, it appears that he was taken into custody at the hearing.
13

Fleming had recently been released from custody. T09:ll:18. The prosecutor
attempted personal service, but was unable to do so on such short notice. T09:ll:18.
The prosecutor explained that right after the April 2nd hearing, he learned
that his investigator had contacted Fleming's mother to learn of Fleming's
whereabouts.

T09:ll:18.

After the decision to refile had been made, the

prosecution's investigators also contacted Fleming's brother, who lived with
Fleming's mother. Fleming's brother confirmed that Fleming was still in the Salt
Lake area, had contacted his family, and had received the investigator's messages.
T09:ll:19.
Given Fleming's history of appearing at prior court hearings, the prosecutor
explained that he had no reason to believe that Fleming would not be cooperative
and appear if subpoenaed. T09:ll:19. The prosecutor justified refiling based on a
reasonable belief that he would be able to locate Fleming and, if necessary, serve
him with a material witness warrant. In addition to the contacts with Fleming's
mother and brother, the prosecutor relied on the fact that Fleming was under the
supervision of pretrial services and scheduled to appear for sentencing on his own
case on April 24,2009 (the day after the Brickey hearing), and, consequently, could
be easily served with a subpoena or material witness warrant. T09:ll:20.

14

The prosecutor further explained that even without Mr. Fleming, the State
would have refiled the case. T09:ll:20,26. Although Fleming "was the witness that
the State was counting on to adduce evidence at the preliminary hearing/ 7 the State
now had sufficient evidence to proceed against both defendants without Fleming's
testimony. T09:ll:20-21. In addition to physical evidence and other witnesses, the
State was in preliminary discussions to have the twin juvenile co-defendants
testify.] * T09:ll:21. The prosecutor explained that he did not subpoena these other
witnesses for the April 2nd preliminary hearing, because he expected Fleming to be
there and did not think he would need them. T09:11:21. The prosecutor contended
that given Fleming's track record of appearing, that expectation was reasonable.
T09:ll:26.
The prosecutor also argued that based on the facts, State v. Atencio, 2004 UT
App 93,89 P.3d 191, was more applicable than Brickey. The prosecutor argued that

As noted earlier, several police officers rescued Fleming from the trunk,
noted his injuries, and found the weapons used to inflict those injuries. R09:3;
T09:ll:15. Fleming also gave a statement to police implicating the defendants.
R09:2; T09:ll:15. That statement, with or without Fleming's presence, might be
admissible as reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing. See Utah Const, art. 1, § 12
(state constitution does not preclude reliable hearsay); Utah R. Evid. 1102 (defining
reliable hearsay for preliminary hearings to include certain written statements of
declarant and other hearsay with indicia of reliability; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT
58, y^ 9-16, 218 P.3d 590 (holding no federal or state constitutional right to
confrontation in preliminary hearings).
15

Atencio and other cases had narrowed Brickeys holding so as to make it inapplicable
where there was no evidence of bad faith or abusive practices on the part of the
prosecution. T09:ll:21-23.
The magistrate's ruling
The magistrate acknowledged that the charges against Defendants were
"serious personal assaultive attacks/7 T09:ll:31. She also acknowledged that
Fleming had appeared at all previous hearings and that the State "had every
indication from Mr. Fleming that they would be able to put on a preliminary
hearing with Mr. Fleming's testimony." T09:ll:32. The magistrate stated that she
had taken all that into account when she determined to dismiss the original
information without prejudice, "because that still afforded the State the opportunity
to freely prosecute very, very serious allegations when they were in a position to go
forward with those cases." T09:ll:33.
The magistrate then recalled that she had specifically asked the prosecutor at
the April 2nd preliminary hearing if the State could go forward without Fleming's
testimony. T09:ll:33-34. According to the magistrate, the prosecutor stated that he
had anticipated a dismissal without prejudice and was ready to immediately refile
the charges.

T09:ll:33-34.

The magistrate remembered, "at that point,"

16

"questioning] if the State was in a position to refile why they could not go forward
with the preliminary hearing/7 T09:ll:34.
In fact, the transcript of the April 2nd hearing does not support the
magistrate's recollection.

It is true that the magistrate confirmed with the

prosecutor that Fleming was both a "key material witness" and "the victim."
T08:26:7. But the magistrate never questioned the prosecutor on why, if he was in a
position to refile, he "could not go forward with the preliminary hearing." T08:26:312. As the prosecutor later explained at the Brickey hearing, he was not prepared to
proceed at the April 2nd hearing with the other witnesses, because he had expected
Fleming to appear and had therefore not subpoenaed his other witnesses. T09:11:21.
The magistrate nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor's "refiling as
quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and bad faith." T09:ll:3538. Specifically, the magistrate found that it was bad faith for the prosecutor to say
that he "could not proceed on that [April 2nd] preliminary hearing because Mr.
Fleming was not present," and then "to walk out the door and upon a phone call
with a family member that they anticipated would hear from [Fleming] and not
even following up with any more attempts to try and get them...." T09:ll:37. The
magistrate essentially viewed the prosecutor's quick refiling as flouting the
magistrate's authority:
17

When the State went out and refiled it as quickly as they did with the
emotions that - well, we're just going to refile this anyway so anything
the court does or anything the defense does is meaningless because this
is a horrible act - and it is - and so we're just going to refile it anyway,
is simply the type of limitations that judicious prosecution cannot pass
and I am not happy with the result of what that means but I don't think
that there is any other way to fairly assess the very aggressive refiling
when the State did not have an adequate change in circumstances to
come forward to the Court and swear that they could then go forward
with the prosecution before they refiled. They simply refiled without
going through the necessary process that they needed to.
T09:ll:37-38. The magistrate then dismissed the cases against both Defendants
"pursuant to the Brickey standard as well as the followup cases that specifically
address abusive factors, find that these factors do rise to those levels . . .' ."
T09:ll:38. See also R09:9 (written order dismissing case on ground that refiling
"violated the standards articulated in State v. Brickey").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate dismissed the refiled felony charges under the authority of
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Brickey held that when charges are
dismissed after a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause, due process
precludes a prosecutor from refiling the same charges unless he or she shows either
that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that some other good
cause justifies refiling. Brickey s presumptive bar to refiling, however, applies only
when potential abusive practices that implicate due process or fundamental fairness
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are involved. This Court has also held that the Brickey rule does not apply where the
prior dismissal was based, not on lack of probable cause after the presentation of
evidence, but on the prosecution's inability to proceed.
The Brickey rule does not apply to this case, because the original charges were
dismissed based on the prosecution's inability to proceed and not on the lack of
probable cause. Also, no evidence suggests that the refiling involved a potential
abusive practice implicating due process.
First, it is undisputed that the first two stipulated continuances were due, not
to any fault of the State, but out of respect for the constitutional rights of the
victim/ witness. Second, it is uncontroverted that the State's inability to proceed at
the April 2nd hearing was not the result of prosecutorial misconduct or neglect.
Finally, refiling without first locating Fleming was not a potential abusive practice
implicating due process, because it neither gave an unfair advantage to the
prosecutor nor worked any fundamental fairness against the defendants. Refiling
without first locating Fleming would, at most, inconvenience the defendants only if
the prosecutor could not proceed as a result. The prosecutor here, however,
represented that he was ready to proceed on the refiled charges with or without
Fleming's testimony. Moreover, that representation had not yet been tested,
because no preliminary hearing on the refiled charges had been set. Consequently,
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the refiling did not even inconvenience the defendants, let alone implicate their due
process rights.
The magistrate, therefore, erred in dismissing under Brickey.
ARGUMENT
BRICKEY DOES NOT PRECLUDE REFILING A FELONY
INFORMATION, WHERE THE PRIOR DISMISSAL WAS NOT
BASED ON A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND WHERE NO
EVIDENCE SUGGESTED A POTENTIAL ABUSIVE PRACTICE
The magistrate based the dismissal of these felony cases solely on the
authority of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). As shown below, Brickey's
presumptive bar to refiling is triggered only when the previous charges were
dismissed for a lack of probable cause based on insufficient evidence and when
there is a potential for abusive practices by the prosecutor. Brickey is not triggered
where, as here, the charges are dismissed, not for insufficient evidence to support
probable cause, but for the prosecutor's inability to proceed.

Moreover, the

prosecutor's immediate refiling in this case was not a potential abusive practice that
implicated due process, where the prosecutor stood able and willing to proceed
with or without Fleming's testimony. The magistrate therefore erred in dismissing
the refiled charges as violating Brickey.
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A. Brickeyfs presumptive bar against refiling applies only when the
original charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause and when
due process is implicated by a potential abusive practice.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine "whether there is
sufficient cause to believe a crime has been committed to warrant further
proceedings/7 Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646. In that regard, the preliminary hearing "acts
as a screening device to 'ferret out... groundless and improvident prosecutions/"
Id. at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)) (omission in
Brickey). If the State produces sufficient evidence to establish "'probable cause that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it/ the
defendant is bound over for trial." State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, If 8,151 P.3d 171. See
also Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2). But if the State does not produce sufficient evidence of
probable cause, the charge is dismissed without prejudice and the defendant
discharged. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3).
Court rule provides that a dismissal for lack of probable cause due to
insufficient evidence does not "preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3); see also Brickey, 714 P.2d
at 646. But the Utah Supreme Court in Brickey held that state "due process
considerations [do] prohibit a prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or

previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies
refiling/' Id. at 647.
The prosecutor in Brickey refiled charges previously dismissed for failure to
establish probable cause at preliminary hearing. Id. at 645. At a second preliminary
hearing before a different magistrate, the prosecutor adduced a little more evidence
and Brickey was bound over for trial. Id. In response to Brickey's motion to
dismiss, the prosecutor freely admitted to forum shopping to obtain a favorable
outcome: "I disagreed with the [first judge], to be honest with you . . . . I have a
chance to come back here every time and represent evidence until I get it bound
over . . . . " Id. at 645-46 [brackets in Brickey],
The Brickey court held that "fundamental fairness" imposed limits on the
State's ability to refile criminal charges dismissed due to a failure to produce
sufficient evidence of probable cause. Id. at 646-47. Otherwise, "the State could
easily harass defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been
dismissed for insufficient evidence/7 Id. at 647. Thus, Brickey held that when
charges are dismissed for insufficient evidence, due process precludes a prosecutor
from refiling the same charges unless he or she shows either that "new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced" or that some "other good cause justifies
refiling." Id. at 647. The prosecutor must also, "whenever possible," refile the
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charges before the same magistrate, "who does not consider the matter de novo, but
looks at the facts to determine whether the new evidence or changed circumstances
are sufficient to require a re-examination and possible reversal" of the earlier
dismissal. Id. The Brickey court borrowed its rule from Oklahoma. Id. at 647 (citing
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, refined
the Brickey rule. It explained that "one important purpose underlying the Brickey
rule is to protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment arising from
repeated filings of groundless claims before different magistrates in the hope that
some magistrate will eventually bind the defendants over for trial." Id. at ^f 13.
Another important purpose was to prevent the State from "intentionally holding
back crucial evidence" to impair a defendant's ability to prepare for trial. Id. at f 14.
In other words, the Brickey rule was based on the premise that "fundamental
fairness" or "due process" "precludes, without limitation, a prosecutor from seeking
an unfair advantage over a defendant through repeated filings of groundless and
improvident charges, or from withholding evidence." Id. at % 15. "To the extent
that these overzealous practices may infringe on a defendant's right to due process,
Brickey limits the State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for
insufficient evidence." Id. at \ 15 (emphasis added).
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But the Morgan court made clear that Brickey does not "indicate any intent to
forbid refiling generally or preclude refiling where a defendant's due process rights
are not implicated." Id. at ^ 15. Rather, Brickey's presumptive bar to refiling applies
only "when potential abusive practices are involved." Id. at f 16. "When potential
abusive practices are not involved .. . there is no presumptive bar to refiling." Id.
(citing in support numerous other jurisdictions, including Oklahoma).

See also

Rogers, 2006 UT 85, f 10. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i). "The lodestar of Brickey,
then, is fundamental fairness." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^f 15.
In State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, 37 P.3d 1160, the supreme court provided a
"working list of potentially abusive practices" that could presumptively bar refiling
under Brickey. As it had said in Morgan, those practices include "'forum shopping,
repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the purpose to harass,..
. withholding evidence,... [and] refil[ing] a charge after providing no evidence of
an essential and clear element of a crime.'" Rogers, 2006 UT 85, ^f 11 (quoting Redd,
2001 UT 113,1f 20) (brackets in Rogers).
Thus, the "Brickey rule is a narrow one." State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, <[ 5,
180 P.3d 186. By its terms, Brickeyfs holding limits a prosecutor's ability to refile
only when the charges were earlier dismissed for lack of probable cause after the
prosecutor had presented its evidence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47. See also Morgan,
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2001 UT 87, f 15; State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, \ 19, 89 P.3d 1 91 And the Utah
Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to expand the rule beyond those instances
when a potential abusive practice truly implicates due process. See, e.g., Morgan,
2001 UT 87, Tff 21-25 (due process not implicated under Brickey by refiling when
prosecutor innocently miscalculates quantum of evidence necessary for bindover);
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, Tjlj 5, 12-21 (due process not implicated under Brickey when
magistrate continues preliminary hearing to allow State to prepare and present
additional evidence). Cf. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, ^ 1-5 (due process not implicated
under Brickey by filing greater charge against defendant after prosecutor failed to
present sufficient evidence of lesser charge at preliminary hearing).
B. Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling does not apply when the
original charges were dismissed based on the prosecutor's inability
to proceed and no evidence suggests a potential abusive practice.
Consistent with the foregoing authority, this Court has held that the Brickey
rule does not apply where the prior dismissal was based, not on a lack of probable
cause after the presentation of evidence, but on the prosecution's inability to
proceed, so long as no evidence suggests a potential abusive practice. State v.
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 19, 89 P.3d 191.
In Atencio, the preliminary hearing was continued twice, once because the
State's toxicology analysis was not yet completed. Id. at Tf 2. Just before the third
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preliminary hearing setting, the prosecutor discovered that her case file was
missing. Id. at ^ 3. At first, the prosecutor believed she could proceed without her
file, but then realized after swearing in her first witness—but before evidence was
presented—that she could not. Id. at ^ 3-4. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the
case without prejudice, but refiled the information two days later. Id. at ^ff 3-5. The
refiled case was assigned to a different magistrate. Id. at ^ 5. Relying on Brickey, the
new magistrate dismissed the refiled charges on Atencio's motion. Id. at f | 5-6.
Relying on Oklahoma cases—on which the Brickey rule was modeled—this
Court reversed. This Court distinguished "between cases that w^ere originally
dismissed because the State was unable to proceed, and cases that were originally
dismissed because the State did not present sufficient evidence" after putting on its
evidence. Id. at ^ff 16-17. This Court primarily relied on Browning v. State, 648 P.2d
1261,1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), where the prosecution was unable to proceed at
preliminary hearing due to a lack of district attorneys and a recent jail break. The
case was dismissed and refiled the next day and, after a second preliminary hearing,
Browning was bound over to stand trial. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 16 (citing
Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263). Relying on Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971) and its progeny, Browning argued that the trial court erred in binding him
over because "no newly discovered evidence was presented to support the refiling
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of the charge/ 712 Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ]\ 16 (citing Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263).
The Oklahoma court disagreed because those cases referred only '"to instances
where the State presented insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing; whereas
in [Browning's] case, the State was not ready to present evidence at the first
preliminary hearing/" Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 16 (quoting Browning, 648 P.2d at
1248).
The Atencio court next cited Lampe v. State, 540 P.2d 590,595 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975). That case held that refiling charges "twice dismissed at preliminary hearing
for lack of witnesses was not a denial of due process." Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^
16. See also Martinez v. State, 569 P.2d 497,499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (due process
did not bar refiling information twice dismissed at preliminary hearing due to rape
victim's failure to appear).
Based on these Oklahoma case, the Atencio court determined that Brickey did
not apply where the dismissal of the original charges was based not on insufficient
evidence after the prosecution had presented its case, but on the prosecution's
inability to proceed:
In Brickey, the original charge was dismissed for insufficient evidence
after the prosecution had presented evidence at the preliminary

12

As stated, Brickey'rs holding was based on Jones. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647.
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hearing. In this case, although the preliminary hearing had technically
begun and one witness had been sworn in, the prosecutor had not
presented any evidence and the case was dismissed based on her
inability to proceed rather than insufficient evidence.
Atencio, 2004 UT 93, <([ 15 (citation omitted). This Court likewise distinguished
Atencio's case from Redd, in which the original charge was dismissed after the State
had presented its evidence at a preliminary hearing. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, n.3.
The Atencio court also found no evidence of a "'potential abusive practice^'
that would have implicated [Atencio's] due process rights/7 Atencio, 2004 UT App
93, Tf 15 (quoting Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 21). First, nothing suggested that the
prosecutor was engaging in a "potential abusive practice" when she misplaced her
file. Id. at *[[ 15. Second, even though a different magistrate had been assigned to the
refiled charges, that fact alone did not demonstrate that the State was engaged in
forum shopping. Id. at ^ 17. Finally, the fact that Atencio may have had "to go to
court on several occasions" on the same charges was "of little significance in the
absence of any potential misconduct on the part of the prosecution." Id. at f 18.
"'[D]ue process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience because the
'nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals
who have been accused of crimes/" Id. at If 18 (quoting Morgan, 2001 UT 87, If 22).
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In sum, the Brickey rule presumptively barring refiling applies only where the
original charges are dismissed for a lack of probable cause after the prosecution has
presented its evidence and where there is evidence of a potential abusive practice. It
does not apply where the original charges are dismissed because the prosecutor is
unable to proceed because of a missing witness, and where no evidence shows the
prosecutor engaged in a potential abusive practice.
C,

Brickey did not bar refiling in this case because the original charges
were dismissed for the prosecutor's inability to proceed and no
evidence suggests a potential abusive practice.
This case is indistinguishable from Atencio. First, like Atencio, the original

charges in this case were dismissed, not for insufficient evidence, but because the
prosecutor was unable to proceed. Like the prosecutor in Atencio, the prosecutor
here put on no evidence. Consequently, in dismissing the original charges, the
magistrate made no assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
probable cause. Rather, the magistrate made clear that she was dismissing the
charges without prejudice because the prosecutor was unable to proceed when his
victim/witness did not appear.

T08:26:10-ll.

Thus, under Atencio and the

Oklahoma authorities relied therein, Brickey did not presumptively bar refiling. See
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 115-16; Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263; Lampe, 540 P.2d at
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595. See also Martinez, 569 P.2d at 499 (due process did not bar refiling information
twice dismissed at preliminary hearing due to rape victim's failure to appear).
Second, as in Atencio, no evidence in this case suggests that the prosecutor
engaged in a potential abusive practice like those listed in Morgan and Redd. See
Redd, 2001 UT 113, ^f 20. Although the refiled case was initially assigned to a
different magistrate, nothing in the record suggests that this was the result of the
prosecutor's request as opposed to random assignment. Indeed, the prosecutor here
agreed that the Brickey motion should be heard by the original magistrate. See
R09:17 (minute entry in Pacheco-Ortega's appellate record); Atencio, 2004 UT App
93, ^ 17 (refiling before different magistrate by itself not proof of forum shopping).
In any event, forum shopping could not have resulted in a better outcome for the
prosecutor where no magistrate had previously assessed the case for probable
cause. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 13 (a chief evil targeted by Brickey was forum
shopping to intentionally harass defendants by repeatedly filing "groundless claims
before different magistrates in the hope that some magistrate will eventually bind
the defendants over for trial").
For the same reason, this case also does not involve the potential abusive
practices of "repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the
purpose to harass/' or "withholding evidence" and "refil[ing] a charge after
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providing no evidence of an essential and clear element of a crime." Redd, 2001 UT
113, If 20. Because the prosecution has never presented its evidence at a preliminary
hearing, the assessment of whether the charges are supported by probable cause or
are "groundless" or "improvident" has never been made.13

Nor could the

prosecutor have withheld evidence when none was presented.
Nor is this a case involving any other potential abusive practice of the sort
listed in Redd. As explained, for Brickey purposes, the abusive practice must rise to
the level of implicating the defendant's due process rights. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87,
^

15-16. This is not a case where the preliminary hearing had to be repeatedly

continued based on the prosecutor's misconduct or lack of preparedness. The
magistrate and both defense counsel acknowledged that the first two continuances
were not the fault of the State. T09:ll:30-32; Add B:4-7; T08:25:4~5; T08:26:5-6.
Indeed, the prosecution was prepared and ready to go with its witnesses—including
Fleming—at the first two settings. The parties and the magistrate agreed that the
hearing should be continued both times, however, to accommodate the
u

It should be noted that this is not a prosecution that rests solely on the
testimony of one witness. Here, according to the probable cause statement, several
police officers rescued Fleming from the trunk of car, observed his serious injuries,
and found the weapons used to inflict them at the scene. R09:l-3. Thus, while the
preliminary hearing screening has not yet been made, these charges could hardly be
called either "groundless" or "improvident."
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victim/witnesses' constitutional rights. Add B:3-6; T08:26:4-7. Moreover, it was
Pacheco-Ortega's counsel who first suggested the need for counsel for the
victim/witness. T08:26:6-7.
The inability to go forward at the April 2nd hearing likewise was not the
product of prosecutorial misconduct or neglect. As the magistrate acknowledged,
the prosecutor reasonably believed that Fleming's presence was assured for the
April 2nd preliminary hearing, because Fleming was in custody. T09:ll:31-33. It
was only the day before the preliminary hearing that the prosecutor learned that
Fleming had recently been released. T08:26:4-5; T09:ll:18. But based on Fleming's
excellent record of appearing, the prosecutor had every reason to believe that
Fleming would voluntarily appear at the April 2nd hearing. T09:ll:15-20. Thus,
this is not a case where the prosecutor was repeatedly unprepared to go forward.
Indeed, until the April 2nd hearing, the prosecutor was always prepared to proceed.
The magistrate nevertheless found that the prosecutor's "refiling as quickly as
he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and bad faith." T09:ll:35-38. The
magistrate found the refiling to be in bad faith because the prosecutor represented
that he "could not proceed on that [April 2nd] preliminary hearing because Mr.
Fleming was not present," but then immediately refiled, based only "upon a phone
call with a family member that they anticipated [they] would hear from" Fleming.
32

T09:ll:37. The magistrate recalled, albeit erroneously, "questioning] if tho State
was in a position to refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary
hearing." T09:ll:34. Thus, the magistrate viewed the immediate refiling before
locating Fleming as an act of defiance by the prosecutor: "When the State went out
and refiled it as quickly as they did with the emotions that - well, we're just going to
refile this anyway so anything the court does or anything the defense does is
meaningless because this is a horrible act . . . ." T09:ll:37-38.
As a threshold matter, the transcript of the April 2nd hearing does not bear
out the magistrate's recollections. First, the magistrate never asked the prosecutor
why, if the State was in a position to refile it could not go forward with the
preliminary hearing on April 2nd. See Statement of Facts, footnote 9; see also
Addendum D. Second, the prosecutor later explained at the Brickey hearing that he
could not proceed at the April 2nd preliminary hearing without Fleming because,
believing that Fleming would appear, he had not subpoenaed other witnesses.
T09:ll:21. Thus, stating that Fleming was an "essential" or "key material witness"'
was not a representation that the prosecutor could never proceed without Fleming;
it meant only that he could not proceed on April 2nd without Fleming. And even
assuming that the prosecutor believed that he needed Fleming when he made the
April 2nd representation, he was within his discretion to later reassess his case and
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determine in good faith that he could proceed without Fleming, if necessary. The
magistrate's finding of bad faith, therefore, was clearly erroneous.
But even if the finding were not clearly erroneous, the conduct relied on by
the magistrate for the bad faith finding did not rise to the level of an abusive
practice as defined by Brickey and its progeny. Again, an abusive practice for Brickey
purposes must implicate due process or fundamental fairness. See Morgan, 2001 UT
87, Tf^f 15-16. Here, refiling immediately without having first contacted Fleming
worked no fundamental fairness against the defendants. Indeed, refiling without
first locating Fleming would, at most, have merely inconvenienced the defendants if
the prosecutor could not have proceeded at any subsequent preliminary hearing.
The prosecutor, however, informed the magistrate that he could and would proceed
on the refiled charges with or without Fleming's presence. But at the time of the
Brickey hearing, no preliminary hearing had yet been set. Thus, refiling the charges
without having contacted Fleming personally did not even inconvenience the
defendants, let alone implicate due process concerns. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 22
(due process not concerned with "ordinary levels of inconvenience'' because "nature
of criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who have
been accused of crimes").
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Refiling the charges without having first found Fleming also gave the
prosecutor no unfair advantage. If anything, it placed the prosecutor in a more
precarious position by potentially requiring him to proceed without the victim,
should the State ultimately be unable to find him before the next preliminary
hearing.

Given that the refiling under these circumstances neither gave the

prosecutor an unfair advantage nor even inconvenienced the defendants, if the
prosecutor did act in bad faith, his conduct did not constitute a potential abusive
practice for Brickey purposes.
At bottom, the magistrate's finding of bad faith related not to due process
concerns, but to her belief that the prosecutor had flouted her authority and prior
instructions. The remedy for a prosecutor's contemptuous behavior, however, is not
to dismiss a serious felony prosecution with prejudice. Rather, the remedy for
contemptuous behavior, if any, is to sanction the prosecutor personally. Cf. Salt
Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1996) ("[dismissal of a
criminal information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely appropriate, even
if the prosecutor is in contempt of court"); State v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270,1274 (Kan.
2000) ("[dismissal of charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the
prosecutor and creates a windfall for the defendant"); Utah R. Crim. P. 25 (setting
forth when dismissal with prejudice appropriate).
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The magistrate therefore erred in dismissing the refiled charges under Brickey.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted March Jtf, 2010.
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Addenda

Addendum A

Rule 7(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Proceedings Before Magistrate
(i)( 1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and
laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and
shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may
testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also crossexamine adverse witnesses.
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistratefindsprobable cause to believe that the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order that
the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has
been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude
the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Dismissal Without Trial
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may,
either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or
indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of
particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to
be charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling
or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable delay, or the
court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the information or
indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the
grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the court may make
such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges
as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and
bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to
trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the
offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case
if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. The injured party shall first
acknowledge the compromise before the court or in writing. The reasons for the order
shall be set forth therein and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall
not be granted when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in
the performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.

Addendum B

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 15, 2009

2

HONORABLE JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6
7

THE COURT:

Is there something we can handle for

either Mr. Sleight or Mr. Peterson?

8

MR. PETERSON:

9

MR. SLEIGHT:

10

THE COURT:
then.

All right.

Hyphenated, there we go.

13

MR. SLEIGHT:

14

THE COURT:

15

And I have Ceron Your Honor,

C-E-R-O-N.

11
12

I have Pacheco-Ortega.

those files then.

Let me get those files
What was yours Mr. Sleight?

Ceron, C-E-R-O-N.
I do have that.

I do have both of

Are each of them still in custody?

16

MR. SLEIGHT:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BOWN:

19

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

And this is yours, Mr. Bown?
Yes it is, Your Honor.
This is why you were writing on your

20

hand the other day because you can't hold onto the hand-

21

helds.

22

that they're standing next to the attorney so that I know who

All right.

23 J they are.

Both defendants are out and I'm assuming

We're using the interpreter, Mr. Peterson for

24

yours, Mr. Pacheco.

25

Ceron?

And do we need an interpreter for Mr.

MR. SLEIGHT:

No Your Honor, Mr. Ceron speaks very

good English.
THE COURT:

All right then.

What is requested on

this, scheduling conference or where are we?
MR. BOWN:

Your Honor, what happened if I'm not

mistaken, I came in after the fact, is Mr. (inaudible) about
this.
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

Okay.
We had our witnesses present, we found

out that our witness (inaudible) in this case has a warrant
outstanding so he needs an attorney.
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

Oh, okay.
He will get an attorney through that

process and we'll just make sure that it happens before our
next preliminary hearing date.

I think we have an agreement

that everybody is agreeing to continue it to the 26th of
February, which works well for all of us.

If I missed

anything else, I'll let defense counsel (inaudible) anything
that I may have —
THE COURT:

Is this something that needs to be

special set or just on any preliminary hearing calendar
that's available on the 26th?
MR. BOWN:

We only have two witnesses, Your Honor.

I don't imagine that there's any other - these are the only
two attorneys for the two co-defendants (inaudible).

1
2

what we're talking about?

3

MR. BOWN:

4

THE COURT:

5

On the 26th of February, is that still

THE COURT:

That's what (inaudible).
Everybody agrees that this should be

continued.

6

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, I think that is

7

appropriate because (inaudible) Michael Fleming to take the

8

stand.

9

the Fifth at this point and so I've advised Mr. Pacheco-

He will be questioned and probably end up invoking

10

Ortega of that procedure peculiarity.

11

somehow the State could facilitate his booking on the - the

12

victim's booking on the outstanding case so that Patrick

13

Anderson can quickly assign conflict counsel.

14
15

THE COURT:

That was my next question.

Mr.

Sleight, you're on this case by conflict.

16
17

What I'd ask if

MR. SLEIGHT:

We were retained by Mr. Ceron's

family.

18

THE COURT:

Oh.

So, this is the first time there's

19

going to be a conflict on this with LDA but with Mr.

20

Peterson—

21
22

MR. PETERSON:

Actually Your Honor, there was a

previous conflict involving juvenile co-defendants who have

23 I now been bound over to adult court but that conflict has been
24
25

dealt with.
THE COURT: Do you think that can all occur by the

1

26th of February?

2

MR. SLEIGHT:

3

MR. SOWN:

Sure.

Yeah, we talked with the (inaudible)

4

victim, Mr. Fleming today.

We're going to facilitate that

5

(inaudible) and get it moving along.

6

MR. SLEIGHT:

7

could set that in the afternoon.

8

morning.

9

THE COURT:

My only request would be that if we
I have some classes that

Well, it's set in the afternoon today.

10

It's my calendar.

I think that will make it easier for

11

everyone to be involved.

12

and let's not have a whole bunch said on that if we're doing

13

this but it doesn't look like it's going to be (inaudible).

14

All right, fair enough.

15

MR. PETERSON:

16

THE COURT:

So February 26, 2:00 my calendar

Thank you, Judge.

Anything else we need to address?

17

Let's make sure we've got sufficient interpreters.

18

need one for at least co-defendant.

19

to need some?

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. BOWN:

We will

Are the witnesses going

No, I don't believe it.

We have the one

interpreter unless they feel (inaudible).
THE COURT:

For a regular preliminary hearing

(inaudible).
MR. BOWN:

I'll leave it up to the interpreter if

they want a break on that.

I (inaudible).

THE COURT:

That I'm not concerned with.

What I

want to make certain is that no witnesses the state
3 I anticipates are going to need —
4
5
6
7
8
9

MR. BOWN:

One will be a police officer and one

will be (inaudible).
MR. PETERSON:

Unless the state were to call the

juvenile co-defendants that have been bound over as adults.
THE COURT:

If they do that then - because we will

need, regardless of how hard the interpreters can work, it

10

one is a witness and one is a defendant, we're going to need

11

separate interpreters.

12
13
14
15
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5 •

Okay?

Very good.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Addendum C

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FEBRUARY 26, 2009

2

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Let me pull those two files then and are

7

they both in custody?

8

Bown, this is your matter?

9
10

MR. BOWN:

Let's have them both brought out and Mr.

Yes, it is.

Judge, can we just deal with

Pacheco-Ortega briefly and then do Ceron.

11

THE COURT:

We'll deal with State vs. Joel Pacheco-

12

Ortega right now with Mr. Peterson and then when we bring out

13

the second co-defendant. Mr. Sleight, we can address your

14

matter.

15

that's the one we'll address first.

16

But if Mr. Pacheco is right in that holding area,

MR. SLEIGHT:

Okay, Your Honor, there is another

17

counsel present for Michael Fleming.

18

does have other matters.

19

we're continuing it today (inaudible).

20
21

THE COURT:

He's a witness but he

We'll talk about his presence and why

All right, thank you.

Mr. Sleight, I do

not have that file before we far as a preliminary hearing.

22

MR. SLEIGHT:

But he does have counsel and he's

23 J present.
24
25

THE COURT:
time.

Is here and present with counsel at this

What is being requested on the Pacheco-Ortega?

1
2

MR. PETERSON:

For the record, Mike Peterson, present

with Mr. Pacheco-Ortega.

3 I

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we have the difficult that

5

the victim witness needed legal representation.

As of

6

yesterday, that victim, Mr. Fleming, was still represented by

7

our office.

8

assigned and fortunately conflict counsel is here present today

9

to consult with Mr. Fleming; however, apparently conflict

So we scrambled around to get conflict counsel

10

counsel would need a little bit more time with Mr. Fleming.

11

They just barely got the file basically late yesterday, as I

12

understand it.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PETERSON:

15

THE COURT:

For the record, conflict counsel may

17

MR. STEUR:

Chad Steur.

18

THE COURT:

Thank you.

16

19

All right, thank you.
So I talked with Mr. Bown -

approach.

S-T-E-U-R as I recall, right,

Mr. Steur?

20

MR. STEUR: Yes.

21

THE COURT:

Chad Steur is defense counsel, is here

22

and present here in court but has just been assigned yesterday,

23

correct?

24
25

Okay.

Thank you.

MR. PETERSON:

Mr. Peterson, if you'd continue.

So I spoke with Mr. Bown about this

situation yesterday, Judge, and we made efforts or best efforts

1

to try to get ready for the hearing today and that's just

2

simply not going to happen in light of the recently appointed

3

conflict lawyer.

4

anything done today and we need to reset.

5

about April 2 as an availability and that looks like a workable

6

date for everyone.

7

So we've sort of agreed that we can't get

THE COURT:

We talked with Pat

All right, thank you.

That is a regular

8

preliminary hearing date, nobody thinks that it's going to take

9

a special setting as far as time to simply put it on that

10

calendar?

11
12

MR. BOWN:

I have two witnesses, one is our victim

witness whose in custody and the other is a police officer.

13

THE COURT:

I think it's easier to keep it on a

14

preliminary hearing calendar if that's the case then so that

15

the transport and everything is as clear as possible.

16

right and that date that has been tentatively set is the

17

April 2 date; is that right?

18

MR. PETERSON:

Yes, Judge, at 8:30.

All

We agreed to

19

meet a half hour earlier to get started here (inaudible) goes

20

long.

21

difficult to reign in.

22

I mean, I understand that Monty Sleight is sometimes

THE COURT:

Oh, he's present.
(Laughter).

I'm sorry.

All right, very good then.

23

April 2 at 1:30 is the time that we will reschedule this

24

preliminary hearing.

25

co-defendants that are both going to be heard at that same

It is at this time being set with the two

1

hearing.

2

brought to the courtroom yet, but he is present and aware of

3

that date.

4

is aware of that setting at this time.

5

1:30 in the afternoon.

6

custody?

7

Mr. Sleight is present.

His client may not have been

Also, Mr. Steur is here representing the victim and

MR. PETERSON:

My calendar, April 2,

What is holding Mr. Pacheco-Ortega in

Judge, I was about to address that.

8

would have argued ordinarily release issues today but there is

9

an ICE hold on Mr. Pacheco-Ortega and I actually have been in

I

10

communication with the Mexican Consulate about this case and my

11

client's situation.

12

any kind of release to pretrial or bail.

13

not waiving his speedy trial rights, it's just that the

14

circumstances mandate this continuance and there's nothing we

15

can do about it.

16

THE COURT:

So he unfortunately is not eligible for
And likewise, he's

I appreciate that being all placed on the

17

record.

It looks to me, Mr. Pacheco-Ortega, all circumstances

18

do demand that and there's no way that we could reasonably

19

expect all parties to be in a position where this preliminary

20

hearing could be heard today given the new conflict counsel now

21 I on the victim.
22

So I am giving that date.

Mr. Peterson is

dealing with as many issues as he can with you.

He is

23 I representing you on this count and will continue to do that and
24

the next hearing is the April 2nd date.

25

Interpreter for Mr. Pacheco-Ortega today.

We are using a Spanish
Does Mr. Ceron need
6

1

an interpreter as well?

2

MR. SLEIGHT:

3

THE COURT:

He does not.
Do any of the witnesses need an

4

interpreter?

5

interpreter for that prelim.

6
7

Thank you.

MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. That's all I have if
I could be excused?

8
9

So we will continue to have the one Spanish

THE COURT:
you had, Mr. Steur?

Very good.

And is that the only matter

Do you wish the benefit of the record?

10

MR. STEUR:

No, Your Honor, I'm okay.

11

THE COURT:

You were able to hear what happened.

12

There's nothing contrary that you wanted to represent.

13

appreciate the fact that you now have been assigned to the case

14

through the representation of the victim and you'll be involved

15

as part of that picture as well.

16
17
18
19

Let's bring him out as

Thank you.
Mr. Sleight, I take it you're on this case by

conflict counsel as well, correct?

20

MR. SLEIGHT:

21

retained by Mr. Ceron's family.

22

Thank you.

All right, is Mr. Ceron here?
well.

I

THE COURT:

Actually, Your Honor, I've been

Oh, okay.

All right.

So this is not

23

conflict and that's why the scrambling yesterday was on

24

conflict counsel because they knew that there would be a

25

conflict with you for quite some time but...
7

1

MR. SLEIGHT:

What I can tell you or Mr. Peterson

2

actually addressed that with you here but he actually let LDA

3

know a week ago - part of our problem was Mr. Fleming was taken

4

into custody later on after the date was set.

5

to go report to pretrial services, did not do that.

6

pushed back our ability to get him an attorney through the

7

court system.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SLEIGHT:

10

We had told him
So, they

All right.
And then Mr. Peterson put that request

in and apparently (inaudible) looked at it.

11

THE COURT:

I appreciate that.

That does offer a

12

little bit of an explanation as to why we did not get that

13

addressed until yesterday afternoon.

Okay, thank you.

14

Is Mr. Ceron - still being brought up?

15

MR. SLEIGHT:

16 I

THE COURT:

Yes.

He's on the third floor.

I thought he was, had already been

17

brought up.

If it's still going to be a while and there's any

18

- but it looks like a hearing, an anticipated hearing?

19

let's try to get this taken care of before.

20

here?

Then

He's still not

21

MR. (?): Thirty seconds.

22

THE COURT:

23 I

(Whereupon another matter was handled.)

24

THE COURT: If Mr. Ceron is here, let's continue

25 I hearing this case.

We'll bring him up.

Mr. Louis Ceron, is that how you say it?
8

1

MR. SLEIGHT: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

Mr. Ceron is stepping into the courtroom

3

now with Mr. Sleight.

4

that we just addressed in the Pacheco-Ortega matter.

5

reset this over for a preliminary hearing on my calendar on

6

April 2, Thursday, at 1:30 in the afternoon.

7

Ortega and Mr. Ceron will be having that hearing.

8

the purposes of why this hearing is not going forward today.

9

Does seem appropriate that it needs to be reset.

10
11

This is a co-defendant on the matter
We have

Both Mr. PachecoWe addressed

What more do we need to address on this matter, Mr.
Sleight?

12

MR. SLEIGHT:

Your Honor, what I'd like the Court to

13

consider is some reduction in bond and the possibility of

14

release for Mr. Ceron.

15

the circumstances, when Mr. Ceron was originally arrested on

16

this charge, the State had filed six charges against Mr. Ceron

17

all felonies, four of those first degree felonies.

18

understanding in speaking with the State, they only intend to

19

pursue two of those, both still first degree felonies but

20

that's a

21

he faced originally.

22

To get the Court up to speed on some of

It's my

significant reduction in the amount of charges that

Part of the reason as I understand it from the State

23 J prospective is they're agreeing to that is that the feds, the
24

Federal Government has essentially picked up what would amount

25

to the drug charges in this particular case and those have been

1

filed federally, and a federal hold has been placed on Mr.

2

Ceron.

3

recognition due to their concern about the State charges.

4

Given that we're at this posture now where the State or because

5

of circumstances I understand that aren't completely in the

6

State's control, that certainly aren't in Mr. Ceron's control,

7

we're not continuing the preliminary hearing for the second

8

time and Mr. Ceron would benefit from a significant reduction

9

on bond in that it would give the feds some basis to reconsider

10
11

At present that federal hold is no bail in part in

his hold under the federal system.
As far as Mr. Ceron's status, Mr. Ceron is a citizen

12

of the United States of America.

He worked very hard to attain

13

that citizenship.

14

relinquish or surrender that citizenship and wants to remain

15

here in the United States.

16

the primary breadwinner for that family, has a home, a business

17

and tries to function as well as possible in the community.

18

given those particular circumstances and given the

19

circumstances that we're here through a delay that's caused by

20

no fault of Mr. Ceron, we'd ask the Court to consider a release

He has no plans that I'm aware of to

He's married, with children.

He's

So

21 I on this matter so that Mr. Ceron could be released to the
22
23 I

federal case.
As the Court is well aware, if Mr. Ceron does receive

24

any sort of release in the federal system, it would be heavily

25

supervised.

The federal pretrial system is even more in touch,
10

1

let's say, with the people that they supervise than our local

2

pretrial services and that isn't saying anything bad about our

3

local pretrial services.

4

lot more resources to put into something and they certainly

5

would put those resources into a situation like Mr. Ceron's.

6

So we'd ask the Court to consider a release in this particular

7

matter or in the alternative, a very significant or substantial

8

reduction in bond that would allow him to re-approach the

9

federal courts about release on the federal case.

10

THE COURT:

It's just to say that the feds have a

All right.

Let me make sure I am clear

11

about the underlying foundation condition that you set, Mr.

12

Sleight, and that is, the State still is anticipating going

13

forward in Count 1, .Attempted Murder with Injury, a first

14

degree felony and Count 2, Aggravated Kidnaping, a first degree

15

felony, those are the two counts still in the State system,

16

still charged against Mr. Ceron, correct?

17

MR. SLEIGHT:

18

THE COURT: Maybe I don't.

19

MR. SLEIGHT:

20

hand.

I have an amended information in my

It's -

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SLEIGHT:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BOWN:

25

Do you have the amended information?

I don't see an amended information.
Okay.

Maybe I do.
The intent may have been to file it in the

last preliminary hearing, I'm not sure.
11

1
2

MR. SLEIGHT: I have an amended information in my
hand.

3
4

THE COURT:

Every time I see an information it does

not have amended.

5

MR. SLEIGHT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BOWN:

Okay.
So what are you charging Mr. Ceron with?

Count 1 is Attempted Murder with Injury, a

8

first degree felony, with the notice that because of the two or

9

more persons and the dangerous weapon enhancement and

10

Aggravated Kidnaping is Count 2, a first degree felony with the

11

same enhancements, the two or more persons enhancement and the

12

dangerous weapon enhancement.

13

THE COURT:

And the only reason that the other

14

charges are not included in this amended information is because

15

they are being pursued by another jurisdiction.

16

MR. BOWN:

17

THE COURT:

18

to the request then?

19

MR. BOWN:

And that's the federal system.
All right.

What is the State's response

Your Honor, I mean, I understand where Mr.

20

Sleight and Mr. Ceron are coming from but as you well know,

21

it's not - the State is not involved in this either.

22

problem where another person who has a Fifth Amendment right -

It was a

23 I I mean, that (inaudible) without his attorney consenting or
24

being able to adequately represent him and that just wasn't the

25

case.
12

1

I think more telling than anything else with Mr.

2

Ceron is he actually was given the opportunity to choose

3

whether he wanted to be in federal custody or state custody.

4

He chose federal custody at that point.

5

just look at the charges.

6

other charges that are part of the holding (inaudible), I

7

acknowledge that we're not going to pursue any more, you still

8

have the most, the two most serious charges present which is

9

attempted murder with injury of the first degree and the

Furthermore, if you

I mean, even if you take away the

10

aggravated kidnaping.

11

guilty is not a minimum mandatory but aggravated kidnaping is

12

an automatic prison sentence if he's found guilty of that. I

13

think the bail set at $100,000 is - that's pretty normal for

14

these types of charges.

15

wasn't higher when I was looking to see what the bail amount

16

set at.

17

(inaudible) and that's the State's argument, Your Honor.

18

Attempted murder is not - if found

In fact, I was quite surprised that it

So, I think the bail should remain at $100,000

THE COURT:

Okay, anything further?

Submit it on

19 I that?
20

MR. SLEIGHT:

21

THE COURT:

I would submit it (inaudible).

I agree, Mr. Ceron.

When I look to the

22

reasonableness of the bail, the first thing I have to look at

23

is what the charges are.

24

charges and the $100,000 for these two first degree felonies

25

that involve the type of aggravated allegations and weapon use,

These are the two much more serious

13

1

that is alleged in these charges, it simply raises too many

2

concerns for me as to the safety of the community and your

3 I likelihood of fleeing when the stakes are this high.

So I am

4

denying the request, the bail will remain at the $100,000.

5

is a bailable amount.

6

any posting of bail, there still needs to be some significant

7

supervision here.

8

federal supervision and so I'm not requiring any further

9

supervision if bail is posted here and it maybe done through

10

property.

11
12

It is not a cash only and if there is

I assume that that will occur with the

It is not a cash only bail.
All right, the April 2 date still remains at 1:30 and

on my calendar.

13
14

It

Thank you.

MR. BOWN?: (Inaudible) I think we're all on the same
page.

15

THE COURT: We are all on the same page and also with

16 I everything being reflected on today's hearing, even if there
17

are problems that arise, the hearing needs to go forward on

18

April 2 or there will be considerable rethinking of what's

19

happening.

20

MR. BOWN:

21

the victim as well.

22
23

THE COURT:

We'll be filing the motion to transport

And they're being transported separately

as well as being held -

24

MR. (?):

25

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
I've learned to recognize that color in
14

1

those stripes.

2

custody situation.

3

So very good, you are coming from a different

MR. BOWN:

And the other defendant is being

4

transported separately as well.

5

THE COURT:

So that at least for the purpose of thes

6

hearings we can keep the testimony as untainted as possible.

7

All right.

8

expect that it will continue.

9

Thank you, appreciate everyone's work on it and
Okay.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Addendum D

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 2 , 2009

2

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

3

(Transcriber•' s note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings. )

5
6

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This was a special set time at 1:30

7

be fore the 2:00 on two of the preliminary hearings.

8

I'm dealing with is the Ceron matter.

9
10
11

(All talking)
THE COURT: Okay, at 2:00. Pacheco-Ortega, was it a
co-defendant though?

12

MR. SLEIGHT: Yes.

13

THE COURT:

14

Th e one

And Ceron, thank you.

Those are the

two files I have.

15

Mr. Peterson, you're here for Mr. Pacheco.

16

MR. PETERSON:

17

THE COURT: Ortega. Let's have them, brought out.

18

MR. PETERSON?:

19

Sleight whose is back in holding.

20

end up bringing them both out.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. PETERSON?:

23

THE COURT:

24

both out together?

25

here that —

Pacheco-Ortega.

Mr. Ceron is represented by Mr.
You will probably want to

At the same time.
To address the status.

Is there a problem with bringing them

Do we have any witnesses or anything in

MR. PETERSON?:

There's shouldn't be a problem as

far as the witnesses.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SLEIGHT?:
THE COURT:
problem?

That is the problem.

Is it?

That's correct.

That's the

All right.
THE COURT:

Mr. Sleight is also walking out now.

So we have both of the defendants in the courtroom now and
they're going with their corresponding attorney and Mr.
Sleight is here representing Mr. Ceron.

We're also using the

interpreter for just Mr. Pacheco-Ortega?
. MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

All right and what is anticipated by

this date?
MR. FLATER:

Your Honor, Eric Flater and Todd Olsen

are here on behalf of the State and we have an essential
witness named Michael Fleming who we previously had
transported from the jail.

Unbeknownst to me and my

secretary, he was recently released from jail so the jail
contacted us and said the transport order that we had in
place was not going to happen and we attempted personal
service this morning because Mr. Fleming was scheduled to
appear at AP&P for a presentence interview with AP&P.

He

failed to show up to that AP&P appointment and we at this
point don't know his whereabouts.

I've an investigator who

1

has communicated with him in the past, tried to locate him

2

but was unsuccessful in doing that.

3

Fleming's attorney is present and —

4
5

THE COURT:
role was in this.

6

Mr. Hall who is Mr.

I was just going to ask what Mr. Hall's

Now I remember that.

MR. FLATER:

Okay, thank you.

I spoke with Mr. Hall yesterday and

7

indicated to him that we would like to get Mr. Fleming here.

8

I believe Mr. Hall also attempted contact with his client but

9

was unsuccessful in contacting him.

I know that this

10

preliminary hearing was previously set and we continued

11

because Mr. Fleming was not represented at that point.

12

this point I'm asking the Court to continue this preliminary

13

hearing as well because of this unavailable witness and we've

14

had success in tracking him down in the past but due to the

15

short time frame, were not able to find him for this

16

preliminary hearing.

17

THE COURT:

18
19

Okay.

At

Mr. Sleight, response first of

all?
MR. SLEIGHT:

Your Honor, we would object to any

20

continuance at this point and ask the Court to consider

21

dismissal.

22

actually released pursuant to a plea bargain with the State.

It's our understanding is that Mr. Fleming was

23 [ I don't know how accurate that is and maybe Mr. (inaudible)
24

can (inaudible) that so for the State to say that they were

25

unaware of his release until today I think is a bit

1

inaccurate.

This is also the third setting that we've had

2

for this particular case and each time it's been because of

3

Mr. Fleming and because of some difficulty and we understand

4

that these type things happen but this is a third settting

5

for Mr. Ceron.

6

and get released from the federal cases on federal matters.

7

At the very minimum we'd ask the Court to consider just a

8

straight release on this particular case and order a release

9

of Mr. Ceron that would allow him to go in front of the

This hold is affecting his ability to try to

10

federal judge where if he's released in that matter he would

11

be released into the auspice of federal pretrial. So our

12

motion would be to dismiss at this point in the alternative

13

to the (inaudible) release (inaudible).

14

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

15

Mr. Peterson, your response for Mr. Pacheco-Ortega.

16

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, likewise, on behalf of

17

Mr. Pacheco-Ortega I'd ask the Court to dismiss this matter.

18

Of course it would be a dismissal without prejudice with the

19

right of the State to refile were they to find Mr. Fleming

20

and where Mr. Fleming has actually expressed an active

21

interest in going forward.

22

this preliminary hearing twice because Mr. Fleming had his

23

own active felony matter that he needed representation on.

24

In fact, I was the one that brought that to Mr. Mister's

25

attention back on January 15.

It's true that we've continued

1

THE COURT: I remember that.

2

MR. PETERSON: And so I'm partially responsible for

3

the need to get Mr. Fleming processed.

4

continuances have not been at Mr. Pacheco-Ortega's request or

5

through any fault of his own.

6

forward at the last two hearings.

7

But nevertheless, the

He's always wanted to go

Judge, in this particular case, I'm asking for the

8

dismissal without prejudice rather than the alternative of

9

the dismissal because he lives here, he has a family here, he

10

has work here.

11

that the accompanying immigration hold would likely be

12

relinquished and he'd be allowed to go back to his young

13

family and support them and like I said, if Mr. Fleming were

14

to surface, then we could proceed at that time.

15

If this case were to be dismissed, it appears

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

I'm also

16

reviewing the probable cause statement and maybe Mr. Flater

17

you can add some insight on this one.

18

only the key material witness, he was the victim?

19

MR. FLATER:

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Fleming is not

That is correct, Your Honor.
So, were there other victims that were

injured or —

22

MR. FLATER:

No.

He was -

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FLATER: -the only one.

25

THE COURT: The allegations are that there was the

He was the one that -

1

beating and the tasering and the putting the gun in the

2

mouth, those were all towards Mr. Fleming.

3

MR. FLATER: That's correct, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT: The state does not have other victims of

5

this case.

You may have incidental, but as far as the

6

allegations, the most serious allegations, it's Mr. Fleming,

7

right?

8

MR. FLATER:

9

THE COURT:

That's correct.
All right.

Well, quite frankly, I

10

think all of the attorneys here know that I'm pretty flexible

11

even with our policies of continuances on preliminary

12

hearings but by the third one, and there really just isn't a

13

good faith basis that you think you can get them and Mr.

14

Fleming was certainly aware of the fact that the hearings

15

were going and was - he was appointed with counsel.

16

been given every opportunity to be cooperative in this case

17

and with him being the listed victim, I'm not as concerned

18

about his failure to appear affecting other victims that way.

19

I am going to grant the motion to dismiss.

20

prejudice and given the nature of these offenses I am not

21

going to restrict the State in any refiling, from doing it by

22

warrant.

23

may need to proceed with a warrant.

24

present and represented by counsel, that I ask the State to

25

at least initially start with a summons.

He had

It is without

I think that the serious nature of these, that you
Typically when they're

If the case is
8

1 | refiled and the State is able to meet all of thei requirements
2

that they need to appropriately refile this case , they may do

3

it as they determine is appropri ate and I'm not going to put

4

any restrictions.

5

But with the third setting and again, with Mr.

6

Fleming being in custody, being aware of this, it may very

7

well have even been part of plea negotiations was his

8

testimony.

9

situation that it's not a good faith request that Mr. Fleming

I don't know but it seems likely in this

10

did not know and is going to be cooperative in this.

11

State certainly may get that, this case to that position

12

again but I am granting the motion to dismiss without

13

prejudice.

14

holding those and I don't know if that's going to make the

15

difference in either the federal situation or in the

16

immigration but that's all been placed on the record and my

17

ruling is as it stands for whatever effect that has on the

18

other issues.

19

The

That just means this case isn't going to be

MR. FLATER:

May I make one request, Your Honor,

20

and that is that you stay the order of dismissal until 5:00

21

this afternoon?

22

made arrangements with staff in my office and also the

23

detective assigned to this case anticipating the likely

24

outcome would be a dismissal and made arrangements to have

25

these cases immediately refiled.

I do anticipate refiling these cases.

I've

Would the Court stay its

1

order?

2

MR. SLEIGHT:

Your Honor, I would ask that you not.

3

It sort of undercuts the purpose of the Court's ruling which

4

is Mr. Fleming's absence.

5

regard to Mr. Fleming, that might make sense but with the

6

status quo, it doesn't make any sense holding it until 5:00

7

just for a refiling.

8

MR. PETERSON:

If something were to change with

Your Honor, if I might as well, I

9

think the Court is very clear that (inaudible) incorporated

10

in the Court's order, that as to Mr. Fleming's cooperation,

11

his indication (inaudible) cooperation, that a refiling would

12

be inappropriate in this particular matter.

13

THE COURT:

And that is the basis of my ruling.

14

I'm not going to make any restrictions about when the State

15

can refile because I'm not in a position to be reviewing

16

that.

17

applies and knows statutes and rules that apply that you can

18

refile, but only under certain circumstances and given the

19

underlying basis of why I'm granting the Motion to Dismiss is

20

in fact Mr. Fleming's non-appearance today and it's now 10

21

minutes to 2:00.

22

that would say that if that's refiled again by 5:00 because

23

then that's putting pressure on the refiling without taking

24

into consideration that you still don't have that witness.

The prosecution knows the law, knows case law that

I simply am not going to make any orders

25 I If that changes and you do and the State feels like it can go
10

ahead and refile this case in full good faith, that you can
fju i«»rvvdi:J m l

MI ijiH-vi f-uih tJi; nk ,r<*>i'i - ill O r - tlv- presence

of the essential witness and that all occurs by 5:00, tl> n
I ha I1

]. t^Lty n » > I

It'

iM»w In ii i nut •-s to 0:00 and sirnnlv

making an order that it not occur until a 0-hour time frame,
rii-ike:- in' ^ n c o uiv-ri th*= underlying basis of the orler.

I'm

not restricting thai xeiiling but J t; does need to be iruiJy
r

ind completely meeting all of the requirements the State

needs to do to refile.

Okay?

. MR. SLEIGHT:
moment?

May I have the record for ji ist : i le

(Inaudln^e) record to the state, I was retained by

Mr. Ceron and -

MR. SLEIGHT:
repitibeij tdt ion ^lj<>uJd

(inaudible) contemplate continued
t[

m

t d 1 ^ ol J « >• .-se iu leti'^ t h

matter

and I would appreciate if that's possible, just notify us
t hat;

•

ii' "'- r ? r i J >:d.

'

THE COURT:
a r^tiiner,

.

•

.

Certainly that and the retain - i t was

i pi i v P~ ^ retainer, rmr a conflict?

MR. SLEIGHT:
THE COURT:
that on the recoro.

Yes.
Thank yen i.

I appreciate your placing

Prosecution notes 'who the attorneys are

and certainly again, I haven't made a restriction on the
State If they do go pursuant to warrants but certainly J: a
courtesy let the attorneys who have entered an appearance on
]]

1

this case know that there is a refiling, that's appropriate

2

as well.

Okay?

3

MR. SLEIGHT:

Your Honor, in that regard, I do have

4

a good working address for my client and if the State felt so

5

inclined I would appreciate proceeding with some as if there

6

were - I realize you're not restricting them and they're not

7

bound but nonetheless, I know where he is and we can get him

8

here on a summons.

9

THE COURT:

And it's appropriate that that be

10

reflected on the record.

11

the nature of these offenses that I am not making that

12

restriction.

13

underlying circumstances as to whether it's appropriate to go

14

by warrant or by summons.

15

circumstances are and now it's even been placed on the record

16

that both attorneys would be able to get ahold of their

17

witnesses, excuse me, of their defendants upon a refiling and

18

so you may pursue that as you wish.

19

of the record but again,

20

my order.

Every case, we look at the facts and the

21

MR. SLEIGHT:

22

MR. PETERSON:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

It is pursuant to the - because of

The State is aware of what these

You've had the benefit

I'm not going to make that part of

Thank you for your time, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Anything else that we need to address?

Thank you.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Addendum E

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 23, 2009

2

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

State vs. Pacheco Ortega.

7

Pacheco Ortega here and present?

8

MR. PETERSON:

9

THE COURT:

Is Mr.

He is, Your Honor.

He's in custody and co-defendant in

10

this matter is Mr. Luis Ceron.

11

Mr. Ceron was not transported because of the federal hold.

12

MR. SLEIGHT:

It's my understanding that

That's my understanding as well, Your

13

Honor, and we would waive his appearance for purposes of this

14

hearing.

15

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

Mr. Monty

16

Sleight is here representing Mr. Ceron. Mr. Peterson here

17

representing Mr. Pacheco-Ortego who is coming into the

18

courtroom right now being seated at counsel table.

19

have the interpreter to assist Mr. Pacheco-Ortego and Mr.

20

Aaron Flater is here representing the State on this matter.

21

We also

This matter was put on my calendar a couple of

22

weeks ago at the request of defense counsel for a Brickey

23

hearing.

24

today, a motion from Mr. Peterson.

25

is anticipated that this motion and the Brickey hearing will

I also received just before the noon hour I think
I assume that it really

1

be with reference to both defendants, even though the Motion

2

to Quash the Information is in the name of Pacheco Ortego,

3

defendant only.

4

least dealing with these issues with both co-defendants?

5
6

Am I correct in understanding that we are at

MR. SLEIGHT:

Your Honor, we would join in the

motions submitted by co-defendant's counsel.

7

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

And Mr. Flater,

8

were you able to get a copy of the defense motion before

9

today's hearing?

10

MR. FLATER:

Your Honor, I got one through the

11

email at approximately 11:00 this morning from Mr. Peterson.

12

So I do have a copy of that and he also hand delivered a copy

13

to me in court today.

14

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

Both of the

15

motions are similar and overlapping issues and so I am not

16

giving the benefit of the record to Mr. Peterson since you're

17

the one who filed it and Pacheco Ortega is here and present

18

today.

19

anything to the motion that he wishes.

20

I'll let you proceed and then Mr. Sleight can add

MR. PETERSON:

Thank you.

Thank you, Judge.

Your Honor, I

21

filed the initial Motion to Quash Information asking the

22

Court to dismiss the case back on April 14 and then I

23

subsequently filed an accompanying memorandum supporting that

24

motion today.

25

THE COURT: Thank you. That is what it was.

Did I

have the initial motion?
MR. PETERSON:

I hope you did.

It was in the

original file and I filed it in front of Judge Skanchy when
the case came back on for roll call.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So that has been filed earlier.

It was just the —
MR. PETERSON:

The motion was filed far in advance.

The memorandum was filed today.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PETERSON:

And the basis for the Motion to

Quash and Dismiss is articulated in the motion itself dated
April 14.

I've not seen the pleadings from the State or from

co-defense counsel but I assume the Court is fairly well
appraised of the issues at play based on what I filed both in
terms of the motion and the accompanying memorandum.

I'm

also hoping that the Court has had a chance to review the
original preliminary hearing transcript which is dated April
2, 2009 when we appeared before Your Honor at 1:30 for an
evidentiary witness preliminary hearing.

The State could not

go forward because Mr. Fleming was absent.

The Court did

grant our Motion to Dismiss at that time indicating it was
granted without prejudice with leave of the State to refile
and then there was a lengthy discussion between various
counsel and Your Honor about what the State would need to
adhere to in terms of the appropriate due process and the

1

appropriate care prior to refiling the information in a case

2

that had been dismissed for lack of a witness.

3

So basically Judge, it's our two-pronged position

4

that number one, the information should not have been filed

5

unless it came back before Your Honor for review under State

6

vs. Brickey.

7

procedure that needs to be followed for due process purposes,

8

particularly in a case like this where we have had three

9

different preliminary hearings scheduled for Mr. Pacheco

10
11

I think Brickey is clear that that's the

Ortego and Mr. Ceron.
The first two of those hearings, Judge, as I

12

articulated in the memo were continued because of issues that

13

Mr. Fleming, the principle witness, victim in the State's

14

case had with regard to his own pending felony charges.

15

needed to consult with counsel.

16

preliminary hearing I basically conceded that the State would

17

need some additional time although I put on the record that

18

Mr. Pacheco Ortego was objecting to the continuance.

19

wanted the hearing to go forward at that time. And the same

20

was true as of the second preliminary hearing scheduled on

21

February 26th of 2009.

22

Mr. Fleming, the State's witness/victim had the pending case,

23

had an additional need to consult with counsel and we weren't

24

able to go forward.

25

case taking over from Chris Bohn.

He

At that very first

He

Again we couldn't go forward because

Mr. Flater was newly assigned to the
So there was a little bit

1

of confusion in that regard but nonetheless, we continued a

2

second time, again because of Mr. Fleming's ongoing felony

3 I matter and then that brought us to the preliminary hearing
4 I date as that I previously indicated, on April 2 before Your
5

Honor and again we couldn't go forward because Mr. Fleming on

6

that occasion wasn't present although his assigned defense

7

lawyer was and we made a record about the notice that he had

8

been given and it was an in-court declaration and State's

9

counsel had advised him, his own counsel had advised him;

10
11

nonetheless, he was absent.
So, Judge, our position is that under State vs.

12

Brickey, we basically had a dismissal because the State did

13

not have sufficient evidence to go forward and because of

14

that, there are requirements under Brickey and under the due

15

process clause of the state constitution that the State then

16

has to comply with before a refiling is appropriate.

17

My understanding is that the assigned prosecutor in

18

the case, in fact, refiled the information on the very

19

afternoon of the day that you dismissed the case on the basis

20

of a phone call that the prosecutor's office had with Mr.

21

Fleming's mother who is out-of-state.

22

assigned prosecutor is that the mother said she would be in

23

touch with Mr. Fleming. She expected to be in touch with him

24

in the next few days after that court date that I'm referring

25

to and, of course, the State asked her to have Mr. Fleming

What I was told by the

1

call so they could be in touch with him and talk about his

2

non-appearance and further scheduling.

3

communication that formed a basis for the refiling of the

4

criminal informations against my client and Mr. Sleight's

5

client and co-defense counsel's joint position is that that

6

is not sufficient under Brickey.

7

more contact, a lot more communication, much more

8

substantial, meaningful communications between the state and

9

this missing witness before the refiling is appropriate, not

But it was that

There's got to be a lot

10

some indication from a mother that she might hear from her

11

son.

12

So that's why Mr. Sleight and I took exception to

13

the refiling based on our understanding of those particular

14

facts and particularly in light of what the Court had pretty

15

carefully articulated on the afternoon of April 2 about the

16

concerns that Your Honor had about refiling absent, you know,

17

very significant change of circumstances and I think what

18

that meant was, you better have a good discussion with Mr.

19

Fleming about where he was, why he wasn't there and his

20

intentions to go forward on this and a commitment in that

21

regard before there's a refiling and we simply didn't have

22

that or anything approximating that when this information was

23 I refiled.
24
25

THE COURT:

I'm going to let the State fully

respond but Mr. Peterson, before you complete this initial

argument and statement, what were the circumstances that you
got the information that there was going to be a refiling and
that it was based on what you are alleging was this
conversation?
Flater?

Did you receive that information from Mr.

Was there a phone call before or after the refiling?

How did you receive the circumstances that they were going to
be refiling upon that conversation?
MR. PETERSON:

As you indicated, Your Honor,

directly from Mr. Flater.

He picked up the phone after he

had talked with Mr. Fleming's mother out-of-state and
informed me that based on these communications and assurances
from the mother, that the State was refiling that day.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

So that's how I learned about that.

When you received that phone call did

you have further discussion on whether or not you thought
that was enough substance?

Did you have that discussion with

Mr. Flater that you didn't think that was sufficient change
in circumstance?
MR. PETERSON:

Yes Judge, both on the phone I had

that discussion with Mr. Flater and also in the lobby of this
courthouse after your dismissal order was in place, I was
downstairs talking with Trish Cassel about another pending
felony matter and Mr. Flater asked a question about case
authority on point relative to refiling.

My response to Mr.

1

Flater was, well, I think, you know, there's nothing 100

2

percent on point with the direct facts of our case but the

3

Brickey issue would be the relevant issue the court would

4

have to look at and then with Mr. Flater called me that

5

afternoon, I again said, well, if that's the basis for the

6

refiling then we'll be filing the appropriate Brickey

7

objections.

8
9

THE COURT:

All right.

let the State fully respond.

Thank you.

And before I

Mr. Sleight do you wish to add

10

anything to that argument so that Mr. Flater can respond so

11

he'll know what both attorneys are arguing?

12

MR. SLEIGHT:

Let me begin by responding to the

13

questions the Court had for Mr. Peterson.

14

information that the state was proceeding against Mr. Ceron

15

by voice mail.

16

quickly as I could but ended up leaving a voice mail to Mr.

17

Flater indicating that as Mr. Peterson indicated to him as

18

well, that I felt that the conversation with Mr. Fleming's

19

mother was less than adequate, shall we say, to proceed under

20

the Brickey standard and that I felt that more importantly

21

than that, I felt it was a violation of the court's order in

22

this particular matter, that the Court in my view, in my

23

opinion, was very explicit with the State and the State

24

expressed an interest in refiling and very, in my view again,

25

politely tried to explain to the State the necessity of

I was left a voice mail.

I received the

I responded as

8

1

having a very solid indication that Mr. Fleming was available

2

and present and cooperative and would cooperate and testify

3

in this particular matter.

4

the transcript, the most salient part to me unfortunately,

5

it's a question that I've put forth to the Court so I'll have

6

to quote myself and I apologize for that but the statement

7

that I made to the Court was I think the Court - this is on

8

Page 7 of the transcript, very bottom, "I think the Court was

9

very clear in granting our request and I'm hoping this will

10

be reflected in the Court's order that absent Mr. Fleming's

11

cooperation and some indication of Mr. Fleming's cooperation,

12

that a refiling would be inappropriate in this particular

13

matter."

14

the basis of my ruling."

15

been any more clear with the State in this particular matter.

16

In fact, if I might, looking at

The Court's response was, "And that is my, that is
I don't think the Court could have

I've expressed a great deal of frustration to

17

several people about - not just in this case, but the State's

18

practice of refiling after preliminary hearing as a general

19

rule.

20

with the State the importance of Brickey, the importance of

21

complying with the evidentiary requirements of Brickey, but

22

more than that also the importance of proceeding by summons

The courts I think have repeatedly tried to emphasize

23 I when appropriate, not that the court issued that order in
24

this particular case but the State, and I'm not faulting Mr.

25

Flater for this, but the State routinely ignores those orders

from the court and I've been on the wrong side of that,
trying to explain that to people on numerous occasions and
the only way that I can see that the State is going to get
the message is in a case like this for the Court to dismiss
this matter and to dismiss it with prejudice.

I think that

what happened here and I mean, I hate to use the words
prosecutorial misconduct because they spark so much animosity
and that's not what I'm trying to do here.

I think that this

is perhaps based on an office-wide perception at the current
District Attorney's Office, perhaps based solely on Mr.
Flater's perception, but I think what happens when we hear
the words prosecutorial misconduct, we want to assume some
foul intent on the part of the prosecutors.

So let me be

very clear that I don't fault the motive for Mr. Flater
refiling this matter.

I understand the motive for Mr. Flater

refiling this matter, the nature of the charges, the
allegations against Mr. Ceron are serious, some of the most
serious that can be filed by the State.

So his motive and

his belief and his idea of protecting our society, I
understand that motive and in fact sympathize with it but
prosecutorial misconduct and bad faith is not - like we tell
juries all the time, let's not confuse motive with intent.
His intent in this matter was to refile and he did so, in my
view in blatant disregard of the Court's order.

The Court's

order was very specific, unusually specific in this
10

1

particular case, that we needed Mr. Fleming and we needed his

2

cooperation. And in subsequent conversations with Mr. Flater,

3

some of which unfortunately were probably more heated than

4

they needed to be on my side, and I apologize for that.

5

those conversations Mr. Flater has indicated that they still

6

have had no contact with Mr. Fleming and that Mr. Fleming is

7

still unlocatable and I put in a call this morning to Mr.

8

Hall who represents Mr. Fleming.

9

Mr. Fleming.

In

He's had no contact with

I don't think the Court or defense counsel

10

could have done any more to explain to the State that filing

11

under these circumstances was inappropriate and that I think

12

is what crosses the line, that's where we cross that line and

13

we have again, I hate the words, but it's prosecutorial

14

misconduct.

15

prosecutor's role.

16

to protect our society but a prosecutor's responsibility is

17

also to protect due process and to protect the constitution.

18

This case is not just about Luis Ceron.

19

thing this case is about.

20

about the defendant in that matter.

21

process and making sure that the process is fair and

22

appropriate and we don't have a situation where people sit in

23

a jail cell on a second refiling because the court - or

24

because the state did not go to the original magistrate and

25

try to refile in front of the original magistrate and we have

It violates an important part of the
Yes, the prosecutor's responsibility is

That's not the only

The Brickey decision was not just
This is about the

11

1

people sitting in jail cells for weeks on end until we can

2

finally arrange through our system, and our system, I'm a

3

believer in our system, Judge; it's as good as they get out

4

there but it has flaws and this is one of them and this is

5

one of the flaws that Brickey was designed to prevent.

6

have people sitting in jail cells waiting to get a lawyer

7

appointed because they can't afford one or trying to postpone

8

it a second time because the state has refiled by warrant or,

9

you know, we have all of these injustices that Brickey was

We

10

designed to prevent and the only way Brickey functions is if

11

it has teeth and teeth in the law is the word prejudice,

12

dismiss with prejudice and that's what we're asking for in

13

this matter, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

There are a couple of other questions

15

that I want to address before Mr. Flater responds because it

16

may make a difference in part of his response too.

17

two different things that I'm looking to, not only the

18

prosecutions good faith in refiling this but also prejudice

19

that was done to either of the defendants.

20

information, are other matters still holding Mr. Pacheco

21

Ortego at this time?

22

MR. PETERSON:

There are

So just for my

Your Honor, the principle other

23

matter that has been holding him throughout the duration of

24

the case and it was basically a hold that was contemporaneous

25

with the hold in this case is the immigration hold.

And that
12

1

has not expired.

2

that he had to clear up.

3

case and this filing, the immigration hold, I mean, he would

4

have been processed and long gone by now either released back

5

into the United States to live with his family or not.

6

That's a matter of a separate deportation hearing.

7

He had a couple of minor infraction tickets

THE COURT:

He has done that but, but for this

Thank you.

And Mr. Ceron's situation,

8

I understand there was a federal hold and that's why he's not

9

here today.

10

MR. SLEIGHT:

That is the case, Your Honor.

That

11

federal hold is still in existence.

Immediately upon the

12

dismissal in this particular matter, we sought a new hearing

13

to discuss Mr. Ceron's custody status which hearing was

14

cancelled essentially because of the refiling in this

15

particular matter.

16

working with Mr. Ceron's federal attorney, that there was a

17

substantial chance that he might be eligible and might

18

qualify for a federal release given the nature of the charges

19

in the federal court.

20

the State is usually waiting to see what the feds do, this is

21

a situation where the feds have been waiting to see what the

22

state does.

It's our impression and our belief in

Unlike the normal circumstance where

The charges that he's facing federal court

23 J thought somewhat serious, are not those that would normally
24

prohibit his release to federal pretrial services and would

25

not normally prohibit his ability to be placed on federal
13

probation.

Mr. Ceron is a United States citizen, so there

aren't any immigration concerns with Mr. Ceron's situation.
Initially the basis for the feds issuing a no release in his
federal case was this case.

They explicitly stated on the

record that because of the state case they weren't
comfortable with the release on his federal case.

They

initially had concerns about his immigration status but once
it was demonstrated he was a citizen, they backed away from
that.
THE COURT:

All right.

And my reading today the

transcript of the last hearing we had when I dismissed this
matter without prejudice because Mr. Fleming was not present
at that time, both attorneys gave me not in as much detail,
but basically the same responses as to what if anything else
were holding each of the two defendants in custody at the
time.

I had basically that same information at the time of

that hearing.

Anything significantly changed from then, and

it sounds to me like other than because this was refiled,
that those two different processing tracks did not occur, is
that correct?
MR. SLEIGHT:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

They're still being held on the

immigration hold and Mr. Ceron is still on the federal given
those foundational statements.
MR. SLEIGHT: Yes.
14

1
2

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Flater, what would you
like me to know?

3

MR. FLATER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

As Mr. Sleight

4

pointed out, the State is extremely concerned about these

5

cases.

6

background to help understand and explain the State' s actions

7

in this case.

8

was brutally beaten, kicked, stomped on, tasered, hog tied,

9

threatened with guns, one of which was shoved down his throat

I want to provide a little bit of a factual

The victim, Michael Fleming, reported that he

10

to the point that he passed out.

11

his mouth secured by duct tape and he was stuffed in the back

12

in the trunk of a car while he listened to his attackers

13

planning the best way to kill him and dispose of his body.

14

A rag was then shoved in

Now these reports were not just reported by Mr. Fleming.

15

They were also corroborated by the police officers who saved

16

his life by showing up, pulling him out of the trunk, seeing

17

that he had been severely beaten and additionally the police

18

found the defendants present at the scene of the attack.

19

Now that factual backdrop explains the State's

20

great concern and interest in this case and great concern in

21 J attempting to retain custody over these defendants who have
22

been accused of perpetrating this very horrendous crime and

23 J as counsel for defense, for the defendants both candidly
24

admitted today and they expressed at the last hearing, there

25

was, if not a probability, at least a significant likelihood
15

1

that if this case were dismissed and not to be refiled, there

2

was a distinct likelihood that both of these defendants would

3

then be released and if that were to happen the State might

4

face the very real risk that the defendants wouldn't be here

5

to answer to those charges today.

6

I guess, the expeditious manner in which the State chose to

7

refile these particular cases, because of the concerns that

8

were articulated at the last hearing and the hearing today.

9

That explains some of the,

I also want to discuss the procedural history

10

leading up to the last preliminary hearing and the dismissal.

11

The victim, Michael Fleming, has been personally served by

12

our office three times and on those three occasions, came to

13

court every single time.

14

hearing on November 19, 2008 for the two juvenile co-

15

defendants.

16

hearing.

17

particular defendants, Mr. Fleming was personally served and

18

showed up both times.

There was a juvenile preliminary

Mr. Fleming was served and showed up at that

The other two prior preliminary hearings for these

19

Now as Mr. Peterson articulated earlier, there was

20

a concern, I think initially brought up by Mr. Peterson that

21

this particular witness - and I think it was an appropriate

22

concern that Mr. Peterson brought up - that this witness

23

might need to have counsel appointed and so the first

24

preliminary hearing was continued not at the request of the

25

State but on behalf of the victim of this case who needed
16

1

counsel.

2

The second time - and I need to correct one thing,

3

I was not here at the second preliminary hearing.

The first

4

time that I personally handled this case was at the third

5

preliminary hearing in which the case was dismissed but at

6

the second preliminary hearing, my understanding is in

7

speaking with the attorneys involved, was that Mr. Fleming

8

was here and present once again, being personally served, but

9

that his own attorney, Mr. Hall, was not prepared to advise

10

him at that time and requested a continuance of that hearing

11

at that time.

12

THE COURT:

I'm going to interrupt just to I am

13

clear.

14

subpoena that second time when we appointed Mr. Hall?

15

out of custody and was coming in on subpoena, so the material

16

witness warrant or the transport order to get him here while

17

he was in jail was not involved in that second preliminary

18

hearing?

19

Was he in custody at the time or had he come per

MR. FLATER:

That's correct.

He was

And that brings us to

20

the third preliminary - well, up to that point the State had

21

a very good track record, there was no basis for a material

22

witness warrant.

23

served, he'd come to court every time.

24

hearing at which the case was dismissed because he was not

25

here, Mr. Fleming was not personally served.

All three times that he'd personally been
The preliminary

That was - he
17

had been in custody prior to the preliminary hearing.

The

State requested a transport order and the transport order was
in place.

Approximately 24 hours prior to the preliminary

hearing I received actual notice from my secretary that we
had been notified that he would not be transported because he
was no longer in custody and I believe he did get out before
that point, at some time before that point and somebody from
the state had knowledge of that, whoever was handling his
case.

I personally didn't have knowledge that he had been

released and in those 24 hours we attempted personal service
on Mr. Fleming, but given the very short time period, we were
unable to locate him and personally serve him prior to the
April 2nd preliminary hearing.
And it is accurate that shortly after the dismissal
at the preliminary hearing, I personally received a phone
call from an investigator with the District Attorney's Office
who indicated that he had located Michael Fleming's mother
and brother, had established contact with them.

He spoke

with Michael Fleming's mother.
THE COURT:

This was before the preliminary hearing.

or after?
MR. FLATER:

No, this was after, after the

dismissal, in fact shortly after.

I took the call out in the

hallway after leaving the courtroom.

Our investigator

informed me that he had spoken with Michael Fleming's mother
18

1

on the telephone, that she and Michael Fleming's brother were

2

living in Montana, that she had been in contact with him,

3

that he was here in the Salt Lake area and that she expected

4

to hear from him shortly because he was going to borrow money

5

from her and they needed to make arrangements for her to get

6

the money to him and transfer that money to him.

7

our investigator at that time that when he contacted her that

8

she would in turn contact our investigator and give him the

9

information for Mr. Fleming so that we could speak with him.

10

She told

Since that time our investigators from our office

11

have spoken again with Mr. Fleming's brother.

As far as I

12

know, we have not yet heard from his mother again, but his

13

brother who lives with his mother has been in contact with

14

Mr. Fleming.

15

here in the Salt Lake area and that he had contact with him

16

and was able to relay messages from our investigator through

17

his brother to Michael.

18

Nobody from our office has directly spoken with Michael

19

Fleming but through his family members there has been

20

indirect communication at that point.

21

happened after the decision to refile had been made, namely

22

the communication with his brother where messages were

He also indicated that Mr. Fleming was still

So there has been indirect contact.

Well, and some of that

23 I exchanged.
24
25

As far as Mr. Fleming's cooperation, up to that
point Mr. Fleming has shown every indication of being
19

1

available and being present until the time that we weren't

2

able to serve him.

3

court when the preliminary hearing was set but probably did

4

not have anything on paper telling him he needed to come back

5

to court that day.

6

if Mr. Fleming is semi-cooperative or uncooperative, the

7

State believes that it would be able to locate Mr. Fleming,

8

that we have good information to be able to track him down

9

for a number of different reasons.

I do think that he had previously been in

It may have just been an oversight.

Even

Number one, he's released

10

to pretrial services currently.

He is scheduled for a

11

sentencing on his own case on April 24 and after that

12

presumably because it's a felony case, he will either be in

13

custody or on probation with Adult Probation and Parole.

14

There's a lot of, I guess, reasons to believe that the State

15

will be able to find and locate Mr. Fleming and if necessary

16 I serve a material witness warrant if he is not willing to
17
18

respond to personal service.
And Your Honor, I would submit that those facts and

19

all of those circumstances would be enough in and of

20

themselves to justify the State's refiling and indicate that

21

the State's refiling of this case was done in good faith.

22

But I don't think the analysis even needs to end there.

23

without Mr. Fleming's availability, the State would still

24

refile this case.

25

was counting on to adduce evidence at the preliminary hearing

Even

Mr. Fleming was the witness that the State

20

1

but if he became unavailable, the State - there are other

2

avenues that the State could proceed through to prosecute the

3

defendants Pacheco Ortega and Ceron.

4

other - some of the physical evidence that was collected at

5

the scene, other witnesses, possibly co-defendants in the

6

case.

7

for the juvenile co-defendants and although there is no

8

agreement in place, there was an expressed desire to discuss

9

the possibility of having those individuals testify on behalf

Those being, there were

There have been preliminary discussions with attorneys

10

of the State and so the State believes that there would be,

11

even absent Mr. Fleming, that there would be sufficient

12

evidence through which the State could go again to a

13

preliminary hearing and proceed in a case against the

14

defendants at trial.

15 I

I next wanted to address the legal arguments that

16

have been addressed here.

The defendants have cited Brickey

17

as the case that controls here.

18

that another case that is more closely analogous and that is

19

the case of State vs. Atensio, 89 P Third D-191 which is a

20

case that comes after Brickey, clarifies and distinguishes

21

Brickey.

22

distinction between those cases dismissed for insufficient

I would submit to the Court

In Atensio, the court recognized and emphasized the

23 I evidence where a preliminary hearing was held but the
24

prosecutor didn't put on enough evidence and distinguished it

25

between those that were just dismissed due to an inability of
21

1

the prosecution to proceed which is what we have here.

And

2

in Atensio, the first preliminary hearing was continued

3

because the State needed additional time to get a toxicology

4

report.

5

her file and was unable to go forward and the court

6

dismissed.

7

challenge made and the court declined to extend Brickey to

8

those cases in which there as no evidence taken and there was

9

no evidence of bad faith or misconduct of the prosecutor.

At the second setting the prosecutor did not have

The prosecutor then refiled.

There was a Brickey

10

Your Honor, I believe that's what controls in this situation.

11

I have a copy of that case for the Court if you would like a

12

copy of State vs. Atencio.

13

Another case that's after Brickey, State vs.

14

Morgan, 34 P Third D-767, clarifies, once again clarifies

15

Brickey and explains Brickey, narrows the holding and

16

clarifies that when abusive practices are not involved,

17

there's no presumptive bar to refiling.

18

determined in that case the prosecutor was not engaged in

19

misconduct but simply made an innocent miscalculation in the

20

evidence necessary and the (inaudible) court even

21

acknowledged and they stated that the criminal justice system

22

inconveniences defendants and being in custody can be

23

harassing and oppressive from the defendant's viewpoint but

24

that's not the controlling factor.

25

the due process concerns and those due process concerns

And the court

The controlling factor is

22

(inaudible) in Brickey focus on the bad faith and misconduct
• :>f prosecutors.
And finally , State vs. Zane or Zahn, Z-A-H-N.

The

Court of Appeals reiterated that tlle Brickey rule is a very
narrow one and failed to find a violation of Brickey absent
evidence of abusive p ractices.
Your Honor, 1 submit based on the facts of the
case, the procedural history and the legal - the case law,
1

that the State did appropriately refile this case and I would
ask the Court to make a finding that the State did i lot engage
in practices that were in bad faith or abusive in this
particular case, but that the State had good reason and
justifiable reasons f or refiling this case in these
circumstances.

Does the Court have any questions?

THE COURT:
Mr. Fleming.

Just a couple on the current status of

Was he given a plea bargain in this change of

plea for which he was waiting for the sentencing?

Was that a

plea offer made based in part on his cooperation in
testifying in this case as far as you know?
MR. FLATER:

I don't believe so.

If that was, I'm

not aware of it.
THE COURT:
MR. FLATER:
THE COURT;

Are you the prosecutor in that case?
I'm not the prosecutor in that case.
Is there a bench warrant out for him

since his failure to appear for that sentencing and that

23

1

presentence process?

2

MR. FLATER:

Not yet because he has not failed to

3

appear for sentencing.

4

24th.

5

THE COURT:

6

presentence process?

7
8
9
10
11

The sentencing is scheduled for April

Has he gone into AP&P and done the

MR. FLATER:

He did not go into AP&P for his

presentence interview.
THE COURT:

And he's not responding to pretrial on

a regular basis and reporting to them?
MR. FLATER:

I checked with pretrial and he has

12

checked in with pretrial on a couple of different occasions

13

since his release.

14

two or three dates he has checked in with them.

15

those dates with me but they indicated that he has called in

16

and checked in a couple of different times with them.

17

They haven't been regular but on at least

THE COURT:

I don't have

So with the information from Mr.

18

Fleming's mother and brother, that Mr. Fleming is in the Salt

19

Lake area and is actually reporting to pretrial, you and your

20

investigators have not been able to get him in here?

21 J

MR. FLATER:

Well, Your Honor, at this point there

22

is nothing - I can't send an investigator out to pick him up

23

because there is nothing to bring him in on.

24

him a subpoena but there's no court date to have him

25

subpoenaed to appear at and I'm confident that if we seek and

I could serve

24

get a material witness warrant, that we will be able to
locate him.

We have a lot of information about his contacts,

addresses and so forth but there is nothing that currently
compels him to come before the court.

If the court in his

underlying case issues a warrant, then I think our
investigators would be able to go out and bring him in if
necessary but at this point there's nothing that we can do to
exercise jurisdiction over him until, if and until we get a
material witness warrant or there's another warrant
outstanding for his arrest.
THE COURT: Are you aware of how many times and a
regular basis bench warrants are issued for failure to report
to pretrial on a regular basis or for pretrial revocation or
for failing to appear for the presentence process?

No

warrants or even a revocation of pretrial has been sought on
those minimal issues with Mr. Fleming.

You're just waiting

until he fails to appear for sentencing before you feel that
you can get any documentation to take him into custody?

Is

that what you're arguing to me, Mr. Flater?
MR. FLATER:

Well, Your Honor, I guess I have to

admit that there's different levels of prosecution in our
office.

I am not involved in prosecuting Mr. Fleming.

I'm

seeking him as a witness and I personally have not made an
attempt to interfere with his case —
THE COURT:

Okay.

That was the extent - that was
25

1

my question and that's what I wanted to know.

2

that.

3

MR. FLATER:

I appreciate

And Your Honor, even as I expressed

4

earlier, even without Mr. Fleming, I believe the State would

5

have made the decision to refile this case because there is

6

other justification for refiling, other reasons to believe

7

that the State could proceed with a preliminary hearing.

8

didn't have those witnesses subpoenaed for the prior

9

preliminary hearing simply because we expected Mr. Fleming to

We

10

be here.

11

thought that we would be able to proceed with his testimony

12

and again at the preliminary hearing level, it's very common

13

for the State not to present its entire case and bring in all

14

of its witnesses and that's exactly what happened here.

15

was almost a one strike and you're out with this particular

16

instance with Mr. Fleming.

17

But with the track record and the history of getting him

18

here, being able to contact him, we believe not only can we

19

get him here but that if we don't get him here that we can

20

still go forward.

21
22
23 I

He had a good track record of being here and we

THE COURT:

It

One no show, and we were done.

Thank you.

Response, both Mr. Peterson

and Mr. Sleight may respond.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, procedurally, do you

24

anticipate asking for additional briefing from the state

25

particularly with regard Atencio, Morgan and Zahn?
26

1

THE COURT:

I'm very familiar with Morgan, familiar

2

with Brickey, familiar with Redd.

3

referred to and Mr. Flater's references to it were the ones

4

that - I'm not anticipating further briefing.

5

MR. PETERSON:

Atencio I have seen

Mr. Sleight and I could go on for 35

6

minutes about why those cases are inapplicable here and

7

beside the point.

8

issue —

9

They really don't pertain to the core

THE COURT:

10

The bad faith.

MR. PETERSON:

- here which is the District

11

Attorney's Office refiling this case without the appropriate

12

basis under Brickey, end of story, period.

13

THE COURT:

14

am ruling on that issue today.

15

That's the issue before me today and I

MR. PETERSON:

So Your Honor, without belaboring

16

all of that other authority and distinguishing it, Mr.

17

Flater's response has a great deal of speculation built into

18

it about well, we might do this or we might have this

19

contact.

20

refile the criminal information that then re-held these co-

21

defendants what did you know then?

22

Brickey and as Mr. Sleight articulated so well, did you

23

comply with Your Honor's order and admonitions about the care

24

the State needed to adhere to before that refiling occurred

25

and it's our joint submission that the State simply did not.

That's not the analysis.

The analysis is when you

Did you comply with

27

1

They didn't comply with Brickey, they didn't comply with the

2

court order and it's on that basis that we're seeking the

3

dismissal.

4

The other thing that's so frustrating about this

5

just to give a little bit of a back story since that's what

6

Mr. Flater was about procedurally is that Mr. Sleight and I

7

attempted numerous times to try and negotiate resolution for

8

our clients at the earlier settings by accessing Mr. Fleming

9

and he shut us down cold.

10

What's so significant about that

Judge is —

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Fleming?

12

MR. PETERSON:

Mr. Fleming.

What's so significant

13

about that and Mr. Bohn would readily acknowledge this if he

14

were present, that in all of the discovery, in all of the

15

police reports, in all of the statements that Mr. Fleming

16

gave to law enforcement, he doesn't indicate that Mr. Pacheco

17

Ortega did anything at all, never laid a finger on him.

18

Pacheco Ortega is an auto mechanic at this shop.

19

Fleming showed up that day at the request of one of the twins

20

who are in juvenile court, Mr. Ortega met Mr. Fleming at the

21

door and they walked together back to an office area of the

22

shop and then all hell broke loose.

23

significantly assaulted and he indicates in his statement

24

that the two twins, who the State now thinks they'd like to

25

seek cooperation on, were kicking him and beating him and

Mr.

When Mr.

I mean Mr. Fleming was

28

duct taping him and putting him in the truck of a car.
of the twins was holding a gun.

One

And likewise, I don't mean

to under cut Mr. Sleight's position here, but Mr. Ceron then
gets involved and does some things of his own.

But Judge,

you know, we have these preliminary hearing settings so we
can get witnesses in and talk to them, see what we can do and
Mr. Fleming won't talk to us.

All I want to do is ask him

one question, in your police statements, you never indicate
my client does anything to you so tell me right now, with Mr.
Bohn, with Mr. Flater sitting here, what did my client do?

I

think the answer is nothing and here we are again at a third
preliminary hearing and post third preliminary hearing where
I'm trying to get this case expedited for Mr. Pacheco Ortega
and I can't largely because of Mr. Fleming.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Sleight?
MR. SLEIGHT:

Just, trying to think how many law

enforcement agencies there are in Salt Lake Valley, coupled
with how many investigators work for the District Attorney,
coupled with their close relationship with pretrial services,
coupled with their relationship with the jail and I will
point out one thing for the Court, Mr. Hall was here and
represented to the Court that while his plea bargain may not
have been a result of any cooperation, his release from
custody certainly was.
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1

THE COURT:

That was placed on the record.

2

MR. SLEIGHT:

That was all on the record and it

3

just boggles my mind that here we are today at a hearing and

4

the State hasn't really even made any real effort to contact

5

Mr. Fleming.

6

brother, nobody has tried to find him and I'm not saying he

7

should have been subpoenaed for today's hearing although that

8

would have resolved things somewhat, but at least talk to him

9

to at least have talked to him and find out, are you going to

They've contacted mom, they've contacted

10

be cooperative in this case?

11

that's what the Court asked the State to do at the last

12

setting and that's what the Court has failed to do and there

13

needs to be a consequence for that, Judge.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FLATER:

16

to some of the factual issues?

That's the real issue here and

Thank you.
Your Honor, may I just briefly respond

17

THE COURT: You may.

18

MR. FLATER: The police report does indicate Mr.

19

Fleming specifically described the actions of five different

20

individuals in this case; the actions regarding the

21

juveniles, Mr. Ceron and then two other individuals, one of

22

whom he describes as having a taser and the other one as

23

having a substance similar to pepper spray that sprayed him

24

with that and he had a burning sensation.

Not only that but

25 I Mr. Pacheco Ortega was the one he described as bringing him
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1

back into the area where he would have been assaulted by the

2

other individuals.

3

charges and our concern with Mr. Pacheco Ortega and then

4

additionally, finally, the State is prepared even if Mr.

5

Fleming is not cooperative, he doesn't have a right not to

6

testify in this case and the State is prepared to seek a

7

material witness warrant, if and when necessary and even if

8

he's not willing, to bring him in forcefully and ask the

9

Court to compel him to testify.

And so there is a factual basis for the

So there is some indication

10

that he's not cooperative but there also are mechanisms to

11

have a recalcitrant witness testify and that's - if it needs

12

to go to that point, the State will employ those methods.

13

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

14

All right.

I find it very interesting that the

15

State prefaces its argument as to whether or not the refiling

16

of this, these very, very serious first degree felonies was

17

in good faith or not with how serious these charges are.

18

am acknowledging at the very beginning of my ruling that

19

these are the most serious, the next to the most serious, I

20

guess.

21

serious personal assaultive attacks on human beings.

22

not dealing with property offenses.

I

They are first degree felonies, they are dealing with
We're

We are dealing with

23 I very, very serious offenses and that is what was first and
24

foremost in my mind when I addressed whether or not it was

25

fair and just to dismiss these counts without prejudice even
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1

without prejudice at the last hearing when the State was

2

unable to go forward.

3

the first time I believe, you might have been here on the

Because Mr. Flater had been here for

4 I initial hearing but the second time when Mr. Bohn,
5

Christopher Bohn was the prosecutor, you hadn't been present

6

and so I knew you were here first time at the last hearing

7

and that Mr. Fleming had in fact been present at other

8

hearings.

9

not clear on whether or not he was here by subpoena or here

My recollection - and I asked again today - was

10

because he had been transported as a witness while he was

11

still in custody.

12

indication from Mr. Fleming that they would be able to put on

13

a preliminary hearing with Mr. Fleming's testimony.

14

continued once. It was continued again and even on the third

15

time I took into consideration everything that has been

But he was here and the State had every

It was

16 I argued by the State with me today to even determine whether I
17

was going to dismiss on that third time, precisely because

18

Mr. Fleming had been available or at least here and ready to

19

testify and this was the first time that Mr. Fleming was not

20

present and ready to testify.

21

appropriate to dismiss and to dismiss without prejudice

22

because that still afforded the State the opportunity to

I determined then that it was

23 J freely prosecute very, very serious allegations when they
24
25

were in a position to go forward with those cases.
I specifically asked Mr. Flater at the time if Mr.
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1

Fleming was the victim of this case, more than just a

2

material witness, if he was the one who had borne the brunt

3

of the beating, the vicious beating and holding the gun in

4

the mouth and the other allegations that are made in the

5

probable cause statement because part of my decision was

6

going to be whether or not other victims had been involved

7

and whether they were here, whether there were other people

8

who had suffered at the hands of these allegations, at least

9

what the allegations were, and my memory - and as I reviewed

10

the transcript again today, that Mr. Fleming is the victim

11

here.

12

I asked Mr. Flater if the State could go forward

13

without Mr. Fleming's testimony and it was clear that he was

14

the victim, he was the material witness and the State needed

15

to have him there to go forward and at that point I

16

determined even though these were very serious charges and

17

this was the first time Mr. Flater had been here and this was

18

the first time Mr. Fleming had not appeared, that a dismissal

19

without prejudice was appropriate.

20

At that time - and that's what brings us to this

21

hearing today and I've given that much foundation because it

22

is important for everyone to realize what I am balancing

23 I today.
24
25

At that time I made the order that there was to be
a dismissal without prejudice and Mr. Flater stated on the
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1

record at the time anticipating that kind of ruling, that

2 I they would immediately refile and at that point I
3

specifically addressed with Mr. Flater that if they were in a

4

position, he either showed the paper or stated he had the

5

paperwork ready and would go immediately outside of my

6

courtroom and refile this case, that the paperwork was

7

already ready, I questioned if the State was in a position to

8

refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary

9

hearing.

That is the basis of refiling, basically you are

10

stating to the court, you are swearing that you are in a

11

position to go forward with this case and you were unable to

12

go forward with the preliminary hearing because you did not

13

have Mr. Fleming.

14

immediately refile, I asked why you couldn't just do the

15

preliminary hearing then and we addressed what the State

16

could refile, that I was not barring refiling but it needed

17

to be under circumstances where you could go forward with Mr.

18

Fleming's testimony.

19

and it's in so much detail is because today we are here on

20

what is called a Brickey hearing.

21

When you stated you were going to

The reason again, that I am doing this

Brickey is a very old case.

It's 1986.

I think we

22

probably have children who are older than that, some of us

23

anyway, and it has been modified multiple times by Atencio,

24

by Morgan, by Redd, by some other cases that have been

25

referred to today and I am very familiar with those cases and
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1

much of the teeth has been taken out of Brickey as far as

2

barring the State from refiling because it recognizes the

3

very, very important right prosecutors have to freely

4

prosecute terrible crimes or any kind of crimes where they

5

have the evidence to go forward and prosecute these crimes

6

but it doesn't negate it to the point where we can't, that

7

the judge doesn't have to - and I really take that

8

responsibility seriously - to weigh the prosecution's right

9

to freely prosecute against very, very important defendant

10

due process restrictions and my analysis has to involve

11

prosecutor's good faith, even the new cases still say absent

12

abusive factors, absent prosecution bad faith, absent the

13

innocent miscalculation I think is what the phrase is on some

14

of the newer cases, then the State can refile.

15

This issue before me today is about as narrow as

16

I've ever seen it on whether or not Mr. Flater's refiling as

17

quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice

18

and bad faith.

19

explained and that Mr. Peterson has explained that Mr. Flater

20

did go out and refile the case within a couple of hours based

21

upon somebody else's contact with Mr. Fleming or based on a

22

contact with Mr. Fleming's family members but no contact with

23

Mr. Fleming himself.

24

any contact with Mr. Fleming himself.

25

I am weighing the factors that Mr. Flater has

The refiling occurred before there was

Even taking into consideration what has happened
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1

since then is the State chose that they still have not had

2

any contact with Mr. Fleming himself.

3

other cases that are holding him, presentence orders that are

4

holding him, pretrial orders that are holding him, family

5

members saying he's still in the Salt Lake basin but even

6

when the State is coming to respond to whether or not their

7

filing was in good faith, they can still not give me any

8

basis that they have had contact with Mr. Fleming.

9

argue that, well, it doesn't matter if we had any contact

They are relying on

To now

10

with Mr. Fleming because we can refile on other basis, simply

11

is not persuasive to me today because 1 specifically

12

addressed that with the State before I dismissed the case

13

even without prejudice.

14

consideration and even then the State told the Court, in

15

spite of the ruling that she had just made that they were

16

going to go out and refile this anyway, they had the

17

paperwork ready and the fact that there was no change in

18

circumstances, didn't seem to deter them from refiling, to

19

then argue that going out and making a phone call or having a

20

contact with a family member and not following up anymore is

21

so minimus that it is even an indication of the bad faith

22

because I specifically told the State that they would need

23

contact with Mr. Fleming, they would need to be in a position

24

to come into this court with that case in tact and if there

25

was no change in circumstances between when I was dismissing

I took all of that into
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1

it because Mr. Fleming was not present and Mr. Flater said

2

they could not proceed on that preliminary hearing because

3

Mr. Fleming was not present, then I find that it was bad

4

faith on the part of the prosecution to walk out the door and

5

upon a phone call with a family member that they anticipated

6

would hear from him and not even following up with any more

7

attempts'to try and get them, that that rises to the level of

8

bad faith.

9

I agree with Mr. Sleight that sometimes legally -

10

sometimes when we hear bad faith, we look at it outside of

11

the legal parameters and I don't think that Mr. Flater has

12

tried in any way to not carry out his responsibilities but

13

the restrictions he had on him are there for a reason and I

14

specifically addressed him for those reasons and absent the

15

fact that we had so specifically restricted them and

16 I addressed those issues already, I might not be finding bad
.17

faith but when I did address them so specifically, to then

18

suggest that a simple phone call with a family member with

19

nothing more is not sufficient good faith.

20

when I balance all of these issues that it seems unfair and

21

improper to dismiss the case with prejudice, but it was

22

without prejudice when I was taking all of those factors into

23

consideration and it is that window of bad faith that means

24

that the Brickey standard requires that it is precisely under

25

those circumstances that it cannot be refiled.

And I agree that

When the
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1

State went out and refiled it as quickly as they did with the

2

emotions that - well, we're just going to refile this anyway

3

so anything the court does or anything the defense does is

4

meaningless because this is a horrible act - and it is - and

5

so we're just going to refile it anyway, is simply the type

6

of limitations that judicious prosecution cannot pass and I

7

am not happy with the result of what that means but I don't

8

think that there is any other way to fairly assess the very

9

aggressive refiling when the State did not have an adequate

10

change in circumstances to come forward to the Court and

11

swear that they could then go forward with the prosecution

12

before they refiled.

They simply refiled without going

13 | through the necessary process that they needed to.
14

So I am granting the motion on the part of both of

15

the co-defendants and dismissing this case pursuant to the

16

Brickey standard as well as the followup cases that

17

specifically address abusive factors, find that these factors

18

do rise to those levels and the information is dismissed

19

against Mr. Ceron and Mr. Pacheco Ortega.

20

MR. PETERSON: The dismissal is?

21

THE COURT: With prejudice, it has to be. I think it

22

has to be.

23

you.

24
25

Thank you.

Thank you.

Appreciate everyone's work.

Thank

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER DISMISSING INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
-vs.Case No. 091902778
Joel F. Pacheco-Ortega
Defendant.

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

The Court, after hearing oral arguments from both parties, finds that in re-filing
this case the State violated the standards articulated in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644,
(Utah 1986). Wherefore, the Court orders that the information in this case is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this Qjfcday of May, 2009. ..

